Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Educators Mutual Insurance: Association, a nonprofit corporation v. Joel Evans : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Curtis J. Drake; Stewart O. Peay; Snell & Wilmer; Attorneys for Plantiff and Counterclaim
Defendant.
J. Wesley Robinson; Attorney for Third Party Defendant.
Brian S. King; Attorney for Defendant and Third Party and Counterclaim Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Educators Mutual Insurance v. Evans, No. 20090527 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1757

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

TN THF, TTTAH COTT1

APPFA

EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANC !•
)CIATION, a non-profit corporation,

vs.

:

JOEL EVANS, an individual,

:

Defendant

:

OPENING BRIEF

Appellate Case No.: 20090527

JOEL EVANS,
Third Party and
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION,
Counterclaim Defendant,
and
SAITIAKl < II V CORPORA HON,
Third Party Defendant,
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENTS ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT T AKE DEPARTMENT, the Hon. L.A. Dever presiding.
r'Vi 1 Oi.vt r'^e No. 040924591)

F.'LLL)
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

Brian S.King #4610
Attorneys for Defendant and Third
Party and Counterclaim Plaintiff
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1739
Facsimile: (801)532-1936

Curtis J. Drake
Stewart O. Peay
SNELL & WILMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant
Educators Mutual Insurance Assn.
15 West South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
J. Wesley Robinson
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
Salt Lake City Corporation
Room 505, City and County Building
451 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)535-7788

O

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE:
ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

vs.
JOEL EVANS, an individual,
Defendant

JOEL EVANS,

:
:

Appellate Case No.: 20090527

:

Third Party and

:

Counterclaim Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION,
Counterclaim Defendant.
and
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

:
:
:
:
:

Third Party Defendant,

APPELLANT JOEL EVANS'
OPENING BRIEF

:

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENTS ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, the Hon. L.A. Dever presiding.
(Trial Court Case No. 040924591)

Brian S.King #4610
Attorneys for Defendant and Third
Party and Counterclaim Plaintiff
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1739
Facsimile: (801)532-1936

Curtis J. Drake
Stewart O. Peay
SNELL & WILMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant
Educators Mutual Insurance Assn.
15 West South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
J. Wesley Robinson
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
Salt Lake City Corporation
Room 505, City and County Building
451 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)535-7788

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

3

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTEPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
TO THE APPEAL
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

20

ARGUMENT

22

IN OFFSETTING EVANS' VETERANS DISABILITY BENEFITS
AGAINST HIS LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS, EDUCATORS
VIOLATED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PELTDA
22
EDUCATORS' THIRTY DAY ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DEADLINE
DOES NOT PREVENT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EVANS' CLAIM
30
THE PLAN'S ARBITRATION PROVISION IS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
33
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE EDUCATOR
TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE EVANS PRESENTED IN 2006 RELATING TO
PROOF OF EVANS DISABILTY FROM ANY OCCUPATION
35
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

39

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Cedar Surgery Center v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58 (Utah 2004)

34

Chandler v. BlueCross BlueShield of Utah,
833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992)

34

Haskinsv.U.S., 51 Fed.Cl. 818, 826 (2002)

26

Hincklev. U.S., 229 Ct.Cl. 801, 805(1982)

26

Lockwood v. U.S.,
2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 157 *27(Fed. CI. June 5,2008)

26

Jane Doe v. U.S., 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 160 (2009)

26

Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust
845 F.2d 885, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1998)
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center,

37

2003 UT 23, 80P.2d904

3,4,5
Statutes

10 U.S.C. §§1201-1222

25

10 U.S.C. §1203(a)

25

38 U.S.C. §1110

25

Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313(3)(a)

32

Utah Code Ann. §49-9-402

.passim

Utah Code Ann. §49-9-402(2)

23

ii

Utah Code Ann. §49-14-102

14

Utah Code Ann. §49-14-102(5) and (6)

24

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-201(6)

14,24

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-401(9)

31

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-402

24,28

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-402(2)

15,22,23

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-402(2)(f)

28,30

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)

3

Other Authorities
Department of Defense Instruction Number 1332.18, P 3.3

iii

25

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann §78-2a-3(2)(j) and Utah R. App.
P. 4(a). Judge L.A. Dever entered an Order in Favor of Plaintiff, Counterclaim
Defendant on May 20, 2009. Defendant, Third-Party and Counterclaim Plaintiff filed a
Notice of Appeal on June 19, 2009.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Since 1991, Joel Evans ("Evans") has received Veterans disability benefits due to

injuries he received in the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Evans returned to his work at
the Salt Lake City police department and over the next nine or ten years, incurred job
related injuries which entitled Evans to disability benefits under the state Public
Employees' Long-Term Disability Act ("PELTDA"). Salt Lake City offset the amount
of Evans' benefits by the amount of his Veterans disability benefits. Does the PELTDA
preclude Salt Lake City from reducing Evans' disability payments by the amount of his
Veterans disability payments? Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record
pp. 186-188, 850-855, 907-911, 988-990. This Court reviews the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Center, 2003 UT 23, ^fl3, 70 P.2d 904, 909.
2.

Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("Educators"), Salt Lake City's

disability plan administrator, imposed a 30-day administrative appeal deadline for Evans'
to appeal Educators' denial of a portion of Evans' disability benefits. Evans missed that
appeal deadline by 28 days and asked Educators to waive the delay but Educators refused
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to do so. May Educators' insist on Evans' strict compliance to the 30-day appeal
deadline? Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record, p. 175-178. This
Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo
standard of review. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, 2008 UT 23,1fl3, 70
P.2d 904, 909.
3.

Educators, as Salt Lake City's plan administrator and agent, sued Evans for

repayment of benefits it claimed it had overpaid him. Evans counterclaimed and brought
third party claims against Salt Lake City for breach of contract for its wrongful refusal to
pay his disability benefits. The trial court granted Salt Lake City's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that Evans was obligated to arbitrate claims against Salt Lake City.
May Salt Lake City sue Evans for repayment on a contract obligation while also asserting
Evans' counterclaims on the same contract must be arbitrated? Citation to Record to
Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record, p. 535-540. This Court reviews the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Center, 2008 UT 23,1(13, 70 P.2d 904, 909.
4.

Despite Educator's arguments that Evans did not timely appeal

Educator's denial of his entitlement to "any occupation" disability benefits after the
initial two year "own occupation" period of benefits, the trial court ruled that Evans did
timely appeal. However, the trial court ruled that Educators did not have any obligation
to consider evidence Evans offered in support of his appeal after the trial court's ruling.
Was Educator's required to consider evidence presented by Evans after the court ruled
that Evans' appeal on the "any occupation" entitlement to benefits was timely? Citation
4

to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record, p. 658-662. This Court reviews the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo standard of review. Smith
v. Four Corners Mental Health Center. 2008 UT 23, Tfl3, 70 P.2d 904, 909.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
The following are central to Evans' appeal:
•The versions of Utah's Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Act in place in 2001
(U.C.A. §49-9-101, et. seq.) and in 2002 (U.C.A. §49-21-101, et. seq.).
•Utah Code Ann. §49-15-601;
•U.C.A. §49-14-102(5) and (6);
•10U.S.C. §1203;
•Department of Defense Instruction Number 1332.18;
•38U.S.C. §1110; and
•U.C.A. §31A-21-312(2)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Joel Evans ("Evans") worked for almost twenty years as a police office for Salt
Lake City Corporation ("Salt Lake City") until October of 2001 when he was no longer
able to continue working due to a variety of disabling medical conditions. Salt Lake City
provides long term disability benefits to its employees through a long term disability plan
(the "Plan") which is administered by Educators. Educators concluded that Evans
qualified for long term disability benefits due to his degenerative disc disease and chronic
pain. However, Educators determined that Evans' disability was not caused by injuries
5

he sustained while on duty with the Salt Lake Police Department, which would have
entitled Evans to payment of 100% of his pre-disability earnings as a disability benefit.
Educators began paying Evans 66 2/3% of his pre-disability earnings as his monthly long
term disability benefit.
After Evans had been receiving disability benefits for a period of time, Educators
began offsetting against the benefits it was paying the amount of money Evans received
from Veterans disability benefits as a result of injuries he sustained while serving for the
U.S. military in the Gulf War in 1991. Educators allowed 60 days from the date of its
decisions for Evans to submit his first appeal. Evans timely appealed Educators'
determination that his disability was not caused by a series of job-related injuries and he
also appealed Educators' offset of his Veterans disability benefit. Educators maintained
its position on both issues and allowed only 30 days for Evans to submit a second appeal.
Evans' second appeal was submitted on the 58th day (rather than the 30th) day after
Educator's first appeal denial and Educators refused to consider the second appeal. As a
result of Evans' failure to submit a timely second appeal, Educator's maintained that the
trial court had no ability to consider Evans' appeals on their merits.
Educators later denied Evans' eligibility for long term disability benefits beyond
the initial two year "own occupation" benefit period and again asserted that Evans did not
appeal that denial in a timely way. Educators argued, based on its claim that Evans had
not timely provided medical evidence, the trial court was precluded from considering
Evans' claim on its merits.
Educators brought suit in Third District Court against Evans for the amount it
6

claimed had been overpaid Evans due to Educators' failure to offset Evans' VA benefits.
Evans filed a counterclaim against Educators, and a third party complaint against Salt
Lake City, alleging that he was entitled to payment of 100% of his pre-disability income
because his disabling conditions were job related; that he had provided sufficient
evidence to support his claim for disability benefits and his benefits should be reinstated;
and that Educators and Salt Lake City had no ability or right to offset Salt Lake City's
disability benefit by the amount of Evans' VA benefit.
On April 7, 2006, the trial court ruled that Evans' failure to provide his second
appeal of Educators' denial of the 100% benefit for work related disability within the
thirty-day time frame established by Educators precluded him from seeking that benefit
but that there were issues of material fact as to whether the Plan was substantially similar
to U.C.A. §49-21 et seq. which would allow Educators to offset Evans' Veterans
disability benefits. The trial court also ruled that Evans had timely appealed the
termination of his "any occupation" long term disability benefits beyond the initial two
year, "own occupation" time period but that Educators had not responded to that appeal.
Salt Lake City moved for summary judgment on the basis that Evans had not
requested arbitration for his claims and that arbitration was required under the terms of
the Plan. Evans argued that the decision by Salt Lake City, through its plan administrator
and agent, Educators, to pursue Evans in litigation constituted a waiver of the right and
obligation of the parties to arbitrate claims between them. On November 7,2006, the
Court granted Salt Lake City summary judgment and held that the arbitration provisions
in the Plan were enforceable against Evans. Despite this ruling, Educators maintained,
7

and continues to maintain, this action as Salt Lake City's plan administrator and agent in
pursuing its claims against Evans in this lawsuit.
After the April 7, 2006 decision from the court, Evans submitted additional
medical records to Educators in support of his claim for long term disability benefits.
Educators again denied that Evans was entitled to benefits. On May 21, 2007, the trial
court ruled that Evans did not provide in a timely way the necessary medical evidence to
support his claim for long term disability benefits for "any occupation" after the original
two year "own occupation" disability period expired and he was therefore ineligible for
benefits after the initial two year period.
Thereafter, Evans and Educators filed cross motions for summary judgment on the
only issue remaining in the case: whether Educators could offset against Evans' disability
benefits from Salt Lake City the amount he was receiving in VA benefits. After an initial
ruling in Evans' favor, on May 20, 2009, the trial court reversed course and ruled that
Educators' offset of Evans' VA benefits was allowed under PELTDA. On June 19, 2009,
Evans filed a timely notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties agree that the essential facts in the case are undisputed and that the
trial court's Orders consisted of conclusions of law based on those undisputed facts.
Those facts are:
1.

Salt Lake City has maintained a Plan to provide disability benefits for its public

safety employees. Complaint ^|6, Answer ^|6, Record p. 91.
2.

Salt Lake City contracted with Educators, to be the administrator for the Plan.
8

Complaint f7, Answer f7, Record p. 94.
3.

The Plan states that its effective date of coverage was July 1,2001 and that,
This Plan will automatically be renewed on its anniversary date
for a period of one year unless otherwise terminated by The City.

Record p. 1032.
4.

The Plan also states:
Any provision of this Plan that, on the effective date, conflicts
with any applicable statutes, is amended to conform to the
minimum requirements of such statutes.

Record 1045. The Plan in effect in 2002-2003 contains the same provisions. Record pp.
91,105.
5.

Evans was a police officer for Salt Lake City for nearly 20 years. While serving

as a police

officer, he suffered a number of injuries and accidents in the line of duty

that caused a variety of physical disabilities. Record p. 247-251, 253-256.
6.

Evans was called to military service and in 1991 had and incurred significant

injuries during the Gulf War. The U.S. government determined that Evans was entitled
to disability benefits through the Veterans Administration. Record p. 112,256,258-271,
273.
7.

In October, 2001, after returning to his job as a police officer in the early 1990's,

Evans became unable to continue working due to chronic pain, migraines, post-traumatic
stress disorder, lumbar disc injury, fused C5-6, degenerative disc disease, head trauma,
and knee and elbow surgeries. He applied for long term disability benefits through
Educators. Record p. 253-256.
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8.

The Plan defines "disabled" as:
[T]he complete inability due to medically determinable physical
or mental impairment to engage in the employee's regular
occupation during the waiting period and the first 24 months of
disability. Thereafter, total disability means the complete
inability, based solely on medically determinable physical
impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation that
is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training and
experience....

Record p. 1043.
9.

In June, 2002, Dr. Stephen Wood, Evans' treating physician submitted an

attending physician statement to Educators in which he outlined Evans' limitations and
diagnosis. Record p. 243-245.
10.

On September 10, 2002, Educators awarded Evans long tern disability benefits for

24 months, effective January 12, 2002, due to degenerative disc disease and chronic pain.
The City paid Evans his full salary until June 6,2002, and Educators began paying 66
2/3% of his pre-disability earnings as his long term disability benefit on June 7, 2002.
Educators also withheld an estimated amount of Social Security Disability benefits to
which it believed Evans might become entitled. Educators gave Evans 30 days to appeal
its decision. Record p. 109-110.
11.

Throughout the time Mr. Evans was receiving long term disability benefits from

Educators, he also was receiving his Veterans disability benefit. Record p.
112,273,258-271.
12.

Educators did not initially reduce the amount of Evans' long term disability

benefits by the amount of the Veterans disability benefit. Record p. 331.
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13.

The Plan provides under Basic Disability Benefits:
The benefit is 100% of covered monthly salary for eligible employees
whose disability occurs in the line of duty, reduced by any other
income. The benefit is 66 2/3% of covered monthly salary for eligible
employees whose disability occurs off duty, reduced by any other
income . . . The waiting period is 12 consecutive weeks from the last
day the covered employee was physically at work, or 12 consecutive
weeks of paid short-tem disability (SDI).

Record p. 1034.
14.

The Plan provides for "Benefits Adjustments and Offsets" if the covered employee

is receiving benefits from certain other sources.
Payments due under this policy will be reduced dollar for dollar
by income received from any of the sources listed below during
the period of time for which benefits are paid under this Plan . . .
•• •

-Armed Services retirement or disability programs.
-Any payment from the United States Government, or state or
local government agency or department thereof, as a result of
the covered employee's employment.
Record p. 1034.
15.

On October 3, 2002, Educators wrote to Evans and indicated it would begin

withholding the amount of his Veterans disability benefits from his long term disability
benefit. Record p. 112.
16.

Evans' attorney, Mark Bell (Bell) wrote to Educators on October 7,2002,

requesting that it pay 100% benefit for Evans' long term disability benefits as allowed
under the Plan because his disability was due to work related injuries. Bell also argued
that Educators was not entitled to offset Evans' Veterans disability benefit and requested
additional documents from Educators. Record p. 114-118.
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17.

On December 11, 2002, Educators' attorney wrote to Bell and upheld its decision

that Evans was not entitled to a 100% benefit and that Educators was entitled to offset
Evans Veterans disability benefits. Educators gave Evans' 60 days to appeal its decision.
Record p. 120-121.
18.

On January 15, 2003, Educators wrote to Bell, requesting reimbursement of its

alleged overpayment of long term disability benefits to Evans by the amount of Evans'
monthly Veterans disability benefit. Record p. 227-228.
19.

On February 10, 2003, Bell wrote to Educators requesting a review of the decision

outlined in Educators' December 11,2002, letter. Bell also requested a copy of an
independent medical opinion referenced in the December 11,2002, letter. Record p. 125.
20.

On March 5, 2003, Educators wrote to Bell and maintained its position that Evans

was entitled to payment of only 66 2/3% of his pay and that Educators was entitled to
offset the amount of Evans' Veterans disability payments against the amount Educators
was obligated to pay Evans. Educators ignored Bell's request for a copy of the
independent medical opinion. Finally, Educators attached a copy of the Claims Review
Process with its letter which stated Evans had 30 days to submit his appeal. Record p. 82.
21.

On May 2, 2003, Bell again wrote to Educators requesting an appeal of the

previous issues raised. Bell's letter outlined several reasons that Educators' decision was
wrong and referenced a copy of the independent medical opinion that Educators had
relied on and that Bell had obtained some time after his receipt of Educators' March 5,
2003, letter. Record p. 127-128.
22.

On May 8, 2003, Educators wrote to Bell and denied Evans' appeal as untimely.
12

Educators relied on the language of that Plan:
If the Covered Person does not agree with the findings of the
Claims Review Committee, in whole or in part, the Covered
Person may request a review regarding the disputed claim and
an in-person hearing by the Educators Board of Directors. This
request must be in writing and must be received by
Educators on behalf of the Plan Sponsor, within 30 days after the
date of the letter indicating the decision of the Claims Review
Committee.
Record pp. 100-101; 130-131.
23.

On May 22,2003 and July 3,2002, Bell wrote to Educators requesting that it

reconsider Evans' appeal. Record p. 133-135, 137-141.
24.

Educators refused to reconsider the appeal by indicating it "cannot change policy

procedures" nor "waive the deadlines." Record p. 237, 239.
25.

On December 10,2003, Educators notified Evans that his payment of his long-

term disability benefits was denied, beginning January 11,2004, on the basis that, while
he may have been disabled from his own occupation (and qualified for benefits for the
initial 24 month disability period), he was not disabled from any occupation and did not
qualify for benefits after January 11,2004. Record p. 143.
26.

On January 7,2004, Evans' successor counsel, Gary Atkin ("Atkin") wrote

Educators and appealed Educator's determination that Evans was not disabled from any
occupation. Record p. 147.
27.

On January 14, 2004, Educators wrote to Mr. Atkin indicating that it would review

Evans' file in the next thirty days and requested any new medical information supporting
Evans' claim for benefits. Record p. 149.
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28.

On February 10, 2004, Evans responded to Educators with an appeal letter

indicating he remained disabled. Evans also referenced Educators' position that Bell had
failed to appeal in a timely manner and requested Educators additional consideration of
his claim.

Record p. 241.

29.

Educators did not respond to Evans' appeal letter.

30.

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-201, a section in PELTDA, requires that:
[e]ach participating employer shall cover its public safety
employees under Title 49, Chapter 21, Public Safety Employees
Long Term Disability Act, or a substantially similar long-term
disability program.

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-201 (2002) (emphasis added).
31.

Utah Code Ann. §49-21-201(6) states:
(6) Public safety service employees, as defined in Sections 49-14102 and 49-15-102, who are covered under a long-term disability
program offered by an employer which is substantially similar to
this program are not eligible for coverage under this chapter (emphasis
added).

This provision of the PELTDA went into effect on July 1, 2002.
32.

The predecessor to U.C.A. §49-21, et. seq., Utah Code Ann. §49-9, et.seq.,

contained a similar provision which states:
The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-term disability benefits
for employees of employers participating in any system administered
by the board except employees covered under the Firefighters'
Retirement Act, or employees covered under the Public Safety
Retirement Act who are covered under a long-term disability program
offered by a political subdivision which is substantially equivalent to
the program offered by the state under this chapter.
33.

Utah Code Ann. §49-9-402 (2001) provides in relevant part:
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(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any
amount received by, or due to, the employee from the following sources
for the same period of time during which the employee is entitled to
receive the monthly disability benefit:
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependent children, except that
if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate for a change in
the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may
not be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined
at the level in effect at the time of the commencement of benefits;
(b) workers compensation;
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs;
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs;
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing
disability income benefits for which contributions or payroll
deductions are made by the employer;
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability
program for which the employee is eligible;
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from
a third party liable to the employee for the disability; and
(h) unemployment compensation benefits
(emphasis added).
34.

Renumbered and amended Utah Code Ann. §49-21 -402(2) (2002) provides that:
the monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount
received by, or payable to the eligible employee from the following
sources • . . :
a.
b.
c.
from
d.
e.
f.

Social Security disability benefits . . . ;
Workers' compensation indemnity benefits;
Any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement
a third party liable to the employee for the disability;
Unemployment compensation benefits;
Automobile no fault, medical payments or similar insurance
benefits.
Any other disability benefits resulting from the
disability for which benefits are being received under this
chapter

(emphasis added).

15

35.

The 2001-2002 Plan indicates that if, after the claims review process is exhausted:
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE INSURED AND
EDUCATORS IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO
THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCATION,
[sic] A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE FROM EDUCATORS.
ALL PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION OF THE
ARBITRATION COMMITTEE, WHICH IS FINAL. THE
ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES IF
ALLOWED BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE ENTERED AS A
JUDGMENT IN ANY COURT OF PROPER JURISDICTION.

Record p. 1041 (emphasis in original).
36.

In November, 2004, Educators filed a Complaint against Evans, seeking $8,510

Educators alleged it had overpaid Evans for long term disability benefits. Complaint
ffl[21,22,Recordp. 331.
37.

In January, 2005, Evans filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint

seeking an order that Educators was not entitled to offset his VA benefit; for payment of
long term disability benefits following January, 2004; and payment of long term
disability benefits at 100% of his pay. Record p. 25-35.
38.

On January 13, 2005, Evans' treating physician, Dr. Stephen Wood, indicated that

Evans was unable to work in any occupation based on degenerative disc disease, s/p C56 fusion for radiculopathy, chronic neuropathic pain syndrome, post-Gulf War syndrome,
interstitial lung disease, coronary artery disease, chronic fatigue syndrome, organic brain
syndrome s/p head injury, chronic migraine headaches and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Record p. 281.
39.

In August, 2005, Educators submitted its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Evans submitted his Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in September, 2005.
16

Record p. 63-77,161-193.
40.

On April 7,2006, the Court held that Evans timely appealed Educators' decision

to deny benefits after January, 2004, but that Educators had not responded. The Court
also held that Evans failed to comply with the contractual requirements of the Plan to
appeal within 30 days his claim that he was entitled to payment of 100% of his predisability earnings for his disability benefits from January, 2002, to January, 2004, and
that this barred him from recovery. Finally, the Court also held that questions of
material fact remained as to whether the Plan was substantially similar to U.C.A. §49-21
et seq., whether Educators was able to offset Evans' VA benefits under the Plan's
language, whether Evans was injured in the line of duty and whether Evans was disabled
from any and all occupations. Record p. 575-577.
41.

On March 22,2006, Educators wrote to Evans and indicated he had sixty days to

appeal the denial of his claim for long term disability benefits after
January, 2004. Educators indicated that Evans had not provided medical information
supporting his disability in January, 2004 and had not undergone a vocational
rehabilitation program. Record p. 706.
42.

On May 19, 2006, Evans' attorney submitted medical records dating from 2003 to

2005, which supported his disability claim. The records included a statement that Evans'
physician did not believe Evans was physically able to undergo or benefit from a
vocational rehabilitation evaluation. Record p. 708-722.
43.

On August 23,2006, Educators wrote to Mr. King and indicated that the

vocational rehabilitation evaluation was not relevant to the review of the case. Record p.
17

745.
44.

On August 28, 2006, Evans underwent an initial contact for a vocational

rehabilitation evaluation. The vocational rehabilitation counselor concluded that Evans
was unable to work in full or part-time employment and did not register him for an
evaluation.
45.

Record p. 747.

Educators ultimately denied Evans5 appeal, claiming he had not provided evidence

to support his disability claim, failed to timely produce records to support his disability
claim and that Evans did not participate in a mandatory vocational rehabilitation
program. Record, p. 635-636, 724-732, 752-753.
46.

On January 17, 2006, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against

Evans. The City argued that Evans did not request arbitration as required by the Plan's
terms. Record p. 490-514.
47.

Evans responded, in part, by arguing that the actions of Salt Lake City, through its

plan administrator and agent, Educators, constituted a waiver of any arbitration process
between the parties that might otherwise be required. Record pp. 519-541.
48.

On November 7,2006, the Court held that the Plan's arbitration provisions were

enforceable and dismissed Evans' third party complaint against the City with prejudice.
The trial court's order did not address Evans' argument that Salt Lake City had waived
any right to arbitrate its dispute with Evans. Record p. 644-646.
59.

On November 6, 2008, Educators filed a Renewed Motion for Summary

Judgment. Record p. 583-614. The trial court held that Evans had not provided
supporting documentation in a timely manner in connection with his appeal to Educators.
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The trial court also held that the issue of whether Educators is entitled to offset Evans'
VA benefits was a remaining question of fact that could not be resolved by summary
judgment. Record p. 795-796.
50.

On May 2, 2008, Evans filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Record p. 844-

873. Evans filed an accompanying affidavit indicating that he received a monthly
Veterans disability benefit but did not receive an armed services retirement or disability
benefit. Record p. 874-876. On May 2, 2008, Educators filed a Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment. Record p. 816-843.
51.

On September 18, 2008, the Court denied both parties' motions and held that the

Act did not allow the City to offset Veterans disability benefits, that the Plan provisions
that allowed Salt Lake City to offset Evans' disability benefits by the amount of his
Veterans disability benefits conflicted with the PELTDA and, as such, Educators was not
entitled to recover the $8,510 it sought in its Complaint. The Court also held that a
question of material fact remained as to whether Evans had received long term disability
benefits from the City for the same disabling conditions for which he was receiving
Veterans disability benefits. Record p. 926-928.
52.

On October 3, 2008, Educators filed a Motion for Relief from Order and Renewed

Motion for Summary Judgment. Record, p. 930-941.
53.

On January 27, 2009, the trial court granted Educators' Motion and held that

Evans' reliance on the 2002 statute was incorrect. The trial court struck its September
18,2008, Order and held that Educators was entitled to offset Evans' Veterans disability
benefits according to U.C.A. §49-9-402 (2001). The trial court further held that if Evans
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was receiving Veterans disability benefits for the same disabling conditions for which he
was receiving benefits under the Plan, Educators was entitled to offset that amount. The
trial court ordered Evans to provide to Educators any information of a separate disability,
if such exists. Record p. 1060-1064.
54.

On May 20,2009, the trial court struck its January 27, 2009, ruling and issued an

Amended Ruling. The trial court held that Educators was entitled to offset Evans'
Veterans disability benefits according to U.C.A. §49-9-402 (2001) and that the intent of
the 2001 and 2002 versions of the statute were consistent. Record p. 1072-1076. The
Court also found that neither the Plan nor the PELTDA required that, in order to offset
benefits, the disabilities for which the covered person was receiving disability benefits
from an "armed services retirement or disability program" be the same disabilities for
which the covered person was receiving disability benefits under the Plan or the
PELTDA. Both parties submitted their proposed orders and the Court entered Educators'
Proposed Order as the correct interpretation of the Court's ruling. Record p. 1068-1070.
55.

On June 19, 2009, Evans filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

56.

On August 7, 2009, the Court entered a final judgment against Evans in the

amount of $8,510.78, plus $3,828.38 in pre-judgment interest, and 2.37%per annum in
post-judgment interest from May 20, 2009 through the date the judgment is satisfied i.
Record p. 1107-1109.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both the terms of the Plan and PELTDA require Salt Lake City and Educators to
provide benefits that are, at the very least, substantially similar to the PELTDA. The trial
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court erred in allowing Educators to offset Evans's disability benefits by the amount he
was receiving for Veterans disability benefits because those federal benefits were for
different disabilities arising out of a different period of time for service provided to a
different employer. In addition, "armed services retirement or disability programs" as
referenced in the 2001 version of the PELTDA, are not the same as Veterans disability
benefits. Offsetting Evans' benefits under the Plan by his Veterans disability payments
did not provide Evans with "substantially similar" benefits as were, and are, provided
under the PELTDA.
The trial court's decision that Educators may strictly enforce its thirty day second
appeal time limit regarding whether Evans was disabled due to job related injuries was
also error. Educators' imposition of multiple, varying times for appeal of claims is not
substantially similar to the terms of the PELTDA. Educators' refusal to waive Bell's
relatively minor delinquency in submitting an appeal for Evans was arbitrary and
capricious and an abuse of any discretion Educators or Salt Lake City had to administer
the Plan. This is especially true in light of Educators' failure to provide documents
requested by Evans' counsel in a timely way and to respond at all to Evans' February 10,
2004 appeal.
The lower court's ruling that Evans is obligated to arbitrate his claims against Salt
Lake City was erroneous in light of the consistent action Educators, as plan administrator
and agent for Salt Lake City, has taken in aggressively pursuing litigation rather than
arbitration. Salt Lake City cannot subject Evans to the expense and inconvenience of
defending against its actions in litigation while insisting that Evans' claims for wrongly
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denied disability benefits must be arbitrated. The actions of Salt Lake City and its plan
administrator and agent, Educators, in litigating this case constitute a waiver of any right
Salt Lake City has to insist that Evans arbitrate his claims.
Finally, having ruled that Evans timely appealed Educators' denial of his right to
payment of "any occupation" disability benefits after January, 2004, the trial court erred
in ruling that Educators did not have any obligation to consider the evidence Evans
submitted in 2006, after the trial court's ruling resurrected his appeal on that issue. The
second ruling effectively nullified, for no good reason, the trial court's initial ruling that
Evans had submitted a timely appeal of the denial in the first place.
In light of the trial court's multiple errors in the handling of the case, this Court
should reverse the trial court on all issues raised in this appeal and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with the arguments presented by Evans.
ARGUMENT
L

IN OFFSETTING EVANS9 VETERANS DISABILITY BENEFITS
AGAINST HIS LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS, EDUCATORS
VIOLATED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PELTDA.
Salt Lake City established its Group Long Term Disability Plan, with Educators as

the plan administrator, in order to provide long term disability benefits to its employees.
The Plan went into effect for Salt Lake employees on July 1, 2001. The State and its
subdivisions, including Salt Lake City, were required to provide disability benefits to all
public employees under the 2001 version of PELTDA, U.C.A. §49-9-101 et seq. Under
U.C.A §49-9-402(2), Educators was allowed to offset from disability payments various
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other specifically identified payment sources for the employee1.
In 2002, the Utah Legislature amended and renumbered PELTDA and modified
the language of the section of the act dealing with offsets based on income from other
sources. Section 49-21-402(2)2 removed language allowing offset of disability benefits
from any "armed services retirement or disability programs" and included subsection (f)
to offset for "any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits
are being received under this chapter."

U.C.A. §49-21 et seq., became effective July 1,

2002.

1

U.C.A. §49-9-402(2) provides in relevant part:
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or due to, the employee
from the following sources for the same period of time during which the employee is entitled to receive the
monthly disability benefit:
(a)
Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the employee's spouse, and the
employee's dependent children, except that if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate
for a change in the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may not be
further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the level in effect at the time of
the commencement of benefits;
(b)
workers' compensation;
(c)
armed services retirement or disability programs;
(d)
civil service retirement or disability programs;
(e)
disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing disability income benefits for which
contributions or payroll deductions are made by the employer;
(f)
any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for which the employee is
eligible;
(g)
any monies received by judgment, legal action or settlement from a third party liable to the
employee for the disability; and
(h)
unemployment compensation benefits.
2

U.C.A. §49-21-402(2) provides in relevant part:
(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or payable to, the eligible employee
from the following sources for the same period of time during which the eligible employee is entitled to receive a
monthly disability benefit;
(a)
Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received by the eligible employee, the
eligible employee's spouse, and the eligible employee's dependent children;
(b)
Workers' compensation indemnity benefits;
(c)
Any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to the
employee for the disability;
(d)
Unemployment compensation benefits;
(e)
Automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar insurance payments; and
(f)
Any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits are being received
under this chapter.
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PELTDA contains an exception to the general requirement for the State to provide
long term disability benefits to all public employees:
Public safety service employees, as defined by Sections 49-14-102 and 49- 15102, who are covered under the long term disability program offered by an employer
which is substantially similar to this program are not eligible for coverage under this
chapter.
U.C.A. §49-21-201(6) (emphasis added). Evans, a Salt Lake City police officer, was
considered a public safety service employee. See U.C.A. §49-14-102(5) and (6).
Salt Lake City opted to establish its own self-funded disability program.
However, the terms of the Plan and the manner in which it was administered, at least as
to Evans' claims, were not substantially similar to PELTDA. The Plan allowed Salt Lake
City to offset its long term disability benefits by the amount of benefits the disabled
employee received from "armed services retirement or disability programs." That offset
was specifically prohibited under U.C.A. §49-21-402(2) effective July 1, 2002. But even
under the terms of the 2001 version of the PELTDA, which the trial court ruled was the
version of the statute that applies to this case, Educators actions in offsetting Evans'
Veterans disability benefits against his PELTDA benefit was improper.
The trial court erred in ruling that Evans' Veterans disability benefits were "armed
services disability benefits" within the meaning of U.C.A. §49-9-402 (2001) and could be
offset by Educators and the Plan. Record p. 927,1072-1076. Evans did not receive
armed services disability benefits which Educators could offset under the 2001 statute
during the time he was receiving long term disability benefits from Educators. Rather, he
received Veterans disability benefits. Armed services disability benefits are not the same
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as Veterans disability benefits. Record, p. 27. Evans stated in his Affidavit that he never
received armed services benefits but, rather, he had been awarded Veterans disability
benefits. Record p. 874-876
The armed services disability benefit is for military disability separation and
retirement. The definitions and limitations are set forth in 10 U.S.C. §§1201-1222. The
U.S. Code allows the military department to retire or separate members when the
individual is unfit to perform military duties because of physical disability. A Medical
Evaluation Board reviews the individual and recommends either return to duty,
temporary disability, separating the individual from active duty or medically retiring the
member. The military rates compensate for loss of a military career as a severance pay.
Id. Armed Services disability benefits are determined for individuals while they are
actively serving rather than after their discharge from the military. 10 U.S.C. § 1203(a).
See also Department of Defense Instruction Number 1332.18 for more information about
military service benefits.
Veterans disability benefits, on the other hand, are set forth in 38 U.S.C. §1110,
and are governed by the Department of Veteran Affairs. This benefit compensates
individuals after their discharge from military service and is calculated based on years of
service and type(s) of injury(ies) incurred during that service. Id. While it may be true
that Veterans disability benefits are provided to service members for injuries incurred
during active duty, they are not the only type of compensation for active duty injuries.
The United States Court of Claims and its successor, the United States Court of Federal
Claims, have both distinguished between Veterans disability benefits and Armed Services
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disability benefits. Hinkle v. U.S.. 229 CtCl. 801, 804-05 (1982) (Veterans disability
benefit awards are distinct from, and determined differently than, active service disability
retirement awards); Lockwood v. U.S.. 90 Fed. CI. 210, 219 (2008) ("although a VA
rating decision may be relevant to consideration of an appropriate disability rating, it is
not binding on the service branch").
Educators also argued that while the Department of Defense may discharge
soldiers based upon disability, payments for those disabilities are made by Veterans
Affairs. This argument creates the illusion that all military disability benefits are to be
considered Veterans disability benefits, which is incorrect.
While both the military and the Veterans Administration use the Veterans
Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities ("VASRD"), the two entities utilize
different objectives and criteria in evaluating and awarding benefits. In Jane Doe v. U.S.,
2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 160, *45-46 (2009), the court found that the military uses the
VASRD "to determine fitness for performing the duties of office, grade and rank,
whereas the VA uses the VASRD to determine disability ratings based on an evaluation
of the individual's capacity to function and perform tasks in the civilian world" (citing
Haskins v. U.S.. 51 Fed.Cl. 818, 826 (2002)).
Evans received his Veterans disability benefit due to posttraumatic stress disorder,
fatigue, memory loss, joint aches and muscle aches with fasciculations, sleep disorder
and occasional vertigo, a skin condition and migraines. It was not awarded until after he
was honorably discharged from the Army. The Department of Veterans Affairs, rather
than a branch of the military service, issued a disability rating for his conditions and pays
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Evans' Veterans disability benefit.
In any event, even if Educators is correct in asserting that until July 1,2002, the
earlier version of the PELTDA applies to this case, after that date, the Plan language
itself makes clear that the provisions of the Plan will be amended to reflect changes in the
PELTDA. The 2001-2002 Plan indicates that:
This Plan will automatically be renewed on its anniversary date for a period
of one year, unless otherwise terminated by The City.
Record, p. 1032. The same provision exists in the 2002-2003 version of the Plan.
Record, p. 91.
In addition, for both the 2001-2002 and the 2002-2003 Plan years, the Plan states:
Any provision of this Plan that, on the effective date, conflicts with any
applicable statutes, is amended to conform to the minimum requirements of
such statutes.
Record at 1045 (for the 2001-2002 Plan) and 105 (for the 2002-2003 Plan).
To the extent there is any conflict between the terms of the PELTDA in place in
2001 and that became effective on July 1, 2002, the rights a disabled individual had under
the Plan were modified to reflect changes in the statute. Evans contends that under both
versions of the PELTDA it was impermissible for Educators to offset his disability
benefits from Salt Lake City by what he received in Veterans disability benefits. But
even if Salt Lake City and Educators had the ability to offset those benefits based on the
"armed services retirement or disability program" language in the 2001 PELTDA, that
ability vanished as of July 1,2002 when the new version of the PELTDA, with its more
straightforward language prohibiting the Veterans disability benefit from offset, came
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into effect.
Interestingly, the trial court's Amended Ruling of May 20, 2009, stated that the
Utah State Legislature's goal in amending the 2001 statute was not to modify the
benefits, but rather to clarify the language. Record p. 1075. Evans disagrees. When the
Legislature deleted the phrase "armed services retirement or disability programs," and
inserted the language found in subsection (f), it was doing more than clarifying the
statute. But to the extent the trial court's conclusion that the 2002 revision to the statute
was a clarifying rather than a substantive change, it supports Evans' argument that the
PELTDA never intended to allow Salt Lake City and Educators to offset Evans' long
term disability benefit by the Veterans disability benefits he was receiving. This is true
because U.C.A. §49-21-402(2) does not identify Veterans disability benefits as an offset
source and more clearly states that Educators and Salt Lake City may not offset payments
being made for a separate type of disability or from a different time frame or employment
period. U.C.A. §49-21-402(2)(f).
There is no question that to allow Educators to offset Evans' Veterans disability
benefits fails to provide him benefits under the Plan that are substantially similar to what
Evans is entitled to under the PELTDA. Educators' application of the offset for Evans'
Veterans disability benefit reduced his long term disability benefit by close to $2,500 a
month for the initial 24-month period Educators paid him benefits. Record p. 331.
Educators' offset reduced Evans' benefit by over 95%. His monthly long term disability
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benefit payment under the Plan decreased from $2,553.90 to $113.904. The significant
disparity between the benefit Evans received under the Plan versus the benefits he would
have received under the Act make it obvious there is no substantial similarity between the
two.
In addition, Evans' medical records make it clear that the injuries and disabilities
for which Evans was awarded Veterans disability benefits from his Gulf War service
were very different than the injuries and disabilities he sustained in the line of duty as a
police officer for Salt Lake City. Evans' Veterans disability benefits were based on
posttraumatic stress disorder, fatigue, memory loss, joint aches, muscle aches with
fasciculations, sleep disorder, migraine headaches and occasional vertigo. Record p. 258271. His long term disability benefits under the Plan were based on degenerative disc
disease and chronic pain from his work-related injuries.
When Evans was discharged from military service, he returned to Salt Lake and
completed almost twenty years of service as a police officer. The conditions involved in
his Veterans disability benefits did not prevent him from working as a police officer.
However, over his years of service with Salt Lake City, Evans incurred several injuries in
the performance of his duty as a police officer. Those injuries were the major cause of
his inability to continue working in 2001.
Even Educators agrees that Evans' Veterans disability benefits are for completely
4

Educators also improperly offset Evans long term disability benefits with its estimate of Social Security disability
income of $1,000 a month from June, 2002 to December, 2002. However, Evans lacks sufficient income credits in
the social security program to qualify for Social Security disability income. Educators has never refunded Evans the
amount it wrongfully withheld but rather improperly applied it to the alleged overpayment amount at issue in the
case
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different conditions than those that disabled Evans in 2001. In November, 2002,
Educators faxed to Evans' treating physician, Dr. Stephen Wood, a letter stating that
Educators would not consider Evans' Gulf War disabilities in its evaluation of his request
for disability benefits under the Plan. Subsequently Educators determined that Evans was
disabled due to degenerative disc disease and chronic pain. Record p. 275.
It is improper for Educators to refuse to consider Evans' Gulf War disabling
conditions when determining his eligibility for long term disability benefits under the
Plan, and, for the same time frame, use the Veterans disability benefits as a basis to offset
payment of Evans long term disability benefits. U.C.A §49-21 -402(2)(f) of the Act
allows only for offsets for uany other disability resulting from the disability for which
benefits are being received under this chapter" (emphasis added).
The amount of money Evans is left with if the trial court ruling is allowed to stand
is a pittance compared to the amount he would be paid under the PELTDA without
allowing for an offset of his Veterans disability benefits. Educators and Salt Lake City
may not make up rules for payment of benefits to their own economic benefit, and Evans'
detriment, that so clearly run afoul of the PELTDA.
II. EDUCATORS5 THIRTY DAY ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEAL DEADLINE DOES NOT PREVENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EVANS' CLAIM
The trial court upheld Educators' application of its thirty-day administrative
appeal deadline on the issue of whether his disabling conditions were a result of injuries
sustained on the job. Educators argued, and the trial court agreed, that Evans failed to
exhaust his administrative appeals and, consequently, the trial court had no ability to
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review Evans' claim. However, Educators' refusal to excuse the failure of Evans'
attorney to file his second level administrative appeal within the strict time frames
unilaterally established by Educators was arbitrary and capricious. In any event,
Educators' appeal deadlines were unreasonable and were not substantially similar to the
rights and obligations outlined under PELTDA.
Educators' Plan is not substantially similar to PELTDA on the point of deadlines
for submitting administrative appeals. The statute does not contain any type of thirty-day
appeal limitation which employees are required to follow. The only time limit found in
U.C.A. §49-21-401(9) states:
A claim brought by an eligible employee for long term disability benefits under
the Public Employee's Long-Term Disability Program is barred if it is not
commenced within one year from the eligible employee's date of disability,
unless the office determines that under the surrounding facts and circumstances,
the eligible employee's failure to comply with the time limitations was reasonable.
(emphasis added). Importantly, PELTDA does allow exceptions to its one-year time
limit based on the reasonableness of an employee's efforts to file a claim in a timely
manner. It is undisputed that Evans filed his disability claim within one year after the
commencement of his disability. Evans complied with the only time limit found in the
Act and should not be held to the arbitrary thirty-day deadline found in the Plan and
strictly enforced by Educators.
Educators' strict enforcement of the Plan's appeal deadlines is especially improper
in light of the fact that Educators set up multiple, mandatory administrative appeals when
an applicant's claims were denied. The initial appeal time frame outlined in the Plan is
60 days. However, the deadline for appeal of the second level denial is 30 days. There is
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no justification for the existence, let alone strict enforcement, of these multiple, varying
time frames. Educators has used them as tripwires for the unwary claimant or their
attorney. Especially when viewed in light of the absence of any similar time limited
framework found in PELTDA, the trial court's rulings upholding Educators' actions must
be reversed.
Even if the Court finds that the differences between PELTDA and the Plan as to
the appeal time requirements are not substantially dissimilar, Educators' refusal to waive
the 30-day time limit or make an exception in this case was unreasonable. According to
the Plan, if a claimant does not successfully appeal in thirty days, he is unable to exhaust
the administrative appeal and pursue legal action. Evans' former attorney submitted an
appeal letter 58 days after the date of Educator's second level denial letter. Evans'
attorney immediately requested that Educators waive his relatively minor tardiness but
Educators refused to do so. Although the Plan required the second level appeal to be
submitted within thirty days, Evans' attorney's late appeal did not result in any prejudice
to Educators, Salt Lake City or the Plan. Utah's notice prejudice rule found at U.C.A.
31A-21-312(2) provides a suitable analogy to these circumstances and demonstrates that
Educators should not be allowed to bar Evans' access to judicial review of his denial of
benefits based on a technical failure to comply with Educators' artificially short time
frames for appealing denied claims under the Plan.
Further, it was unreasonable for Educators to strictly enforce its thirty day appeal
time limit when Educators did not respond in a timely way to Evans own appeals and
requests for documents. For example, it took Educators over two months to respond to
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Mr. Bell's October 7, 2002, letter. In addition, Educators did not respond in a timely way
to Evans' attorney's request for a copy of the independent medical opinion Educators
relied on in making its determination that Evans was not eligibility for disability benefits.
III. THE PLAN'S ARBITRATION PROVISION
IS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The trial court's ruling that Salt Lake City is entitled to enforce the Plan's
arbitration provision must be reversed. Salt Lake City's consistent choice to pursue
litigation against Evans to enforce its putative rights under the Plan is completely
inconsistent with its argument that Evans is required to arbitrate his right to disability
benefits against the Plan.
Acting as the agent for Salt Lake City and as the administrator of the Plan,
Educators initiated this action by filing a Complaint on November 18, 2004 against Evans
alleging Breach of Contract and Quantum Meruit/\Jn)ust Enrichment as causes of action.
On January 3, 2005, Evans filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint
against Educators and Salt Lake City. The City filed an Answer on March 4, 2005.
Almost a year later, Salt Lake City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against Evans
based on the arbitration provision in the Plan. However, Salt Lake City has never taken
any action to rein in Educators, its agent and the Plan administrator, from aggressively
pursuing litigation against Evans in this case. Even after the trial court granted Salt Lake
City's Motion for Summary Judgment, Educators, acting on behalf of Salt Lake City and
the Plan, pursued their claims relentlessly. These actions by Salt Lake City and
Educators constitute a waiver of any right they may have had to compel arbitration by
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Evans of his claims under the Plan.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two-step test to evaluate whether a
waiver of an arbitration clause has occurred. First is whether " . . . the party seeking
arbitration substantially participated in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent
with the intent to arbitrate/' and second, "that this participation resulted in prejudice to
the opposing party." Cedar Surgery Center v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, ^[14 (Utah 2004);
Chandler v. BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992).
As to the first question, Salt Lake City participated in litigation that was
inconsistent with any intent to arbitrate. It directed Educators to sue Evans to recover
amounts it claims were owed from Evans under the Plan. It answered Evans' Third Party
Complaint and did not raise its argument about requiring arbitration until over a year after
its agent, Educators, began litigation against Evans. It is striking that, despite obtaining
an order from the trial court that arbitration is the proper forum for this dispute, Salt Lake
City has made no attempt whatsoever to call its dog, Educators, off of pursuing Evans.
As for the second prong, the City's participation in the lawsuit prejudiced Evans.
Evans has incurred legal expenses in litigation that could have been avoided had the City
immediately requested arbitration. Evans and Educators, acting as the agent of Salt Lake
City, have exchanged numerous motions and pleadings in the case over the course of
several years and Evans has incurred substantial attorney fees and costs in connection
with this litigation. Salt Lake City finds it advantageous to require Evans to fend off
Educators' overpayment claims under the Plan in Third District Court while at the same
time denying that it has to answer to Evans' claims that Salt Lake City and Educators
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owe him money under the same Plan anywhere but in arbitration. This is purely to Salt
Lake City's benefit and to the detriment of Evans' resources. It is an abuse of the
procedural process outlined under the Plan and contemplated by PELTDA.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE EDUCATORS
TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE EVANS PRESENTED IN 2006 RELATING
TO PROOF OF EVANS DISABILTY FROM ANY OCCUPATION.
The trial court erred in upholding Educators denial of Evans' eligibility for long

term disability benefits beyond January, 2004. In December, 2003, Educators wrote to
Evans and told him it was terminating his benefits on January 11,2004, because Evans
had not demonstrated he was disabled from any occupation as required by the Plan.
Evans' right to disability benefits after January 11, 2004, required him to prove that he
was disabled from "any gainful occupation that is reasonable, considering the employee's
education, training and experience." On January 7, 2004, Evans' counsel wrote to
Educators and appealed that denial. On February 10,2004, Evans also wrote to
Educators requesting a review of the denial of his claim for "any occupation" long term
disability benefits. Despite Evans' request, Educators did not respond. It was not until
over two years later, after the trial court ruled that this correspondence from Evans and
his attorney constituted a valid appeal of Evans' right to disability benefits after the initial
two year period, that Educators finally responded to Evans' request for review.
In response to the trial court's ruling, Educators sent a March 22, 2006 letter
denying Evans' appeal on the basis that Evans failed to provide Educators with any
information supporting his claim for disability benefits within thirty days after Educators
requested that information and that Evans had failed to undergo a vocational
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rehabilitation program during the time he was receiving disability benefits. Educators
gave Evans sixty days to appeal its denial of his "own occupation" disability benefits.
Educators' justifications for its denial were weak at best. It already had evidence
that Evans was disabled from any occupation. This included a 2002 Attending Physician
Statement from Dr. Wood outlining Evans' physical condition. Record p. 243-245. In
any event, Evans produced additional information and medical records proving that he
was disabled from any occupation. Record pp. 708-722. In addition, Evans underwent
an initial interview in connection with a vocational rehabilitation evaluation and it was
determined that he was unable to work in any occupation. Record, p. 747
In spite of its earlier concern that Evans was not entitled to continuing disability
benefits because he had not undergone a vocational rehabilitation evaluation, Educators
declared that the initial vocational interview which determined that Evans was disabled
was not relevant and that the supporting "contractually mandated records" were produced
too late in the process. Record, p. 724-725.
Rather than allow Evans an opportunity to prove his claim for entitlement to "own
occupation" disability benefits on the merits, Educators moved for Summary Judgment
on this issue based on its allegation that Evans had failed to comply with the same short
time frames for internal appeals that it had previously used to deny Evans' appeals
concerning his Veterans disability benefits. And, again, the trial court upheld Educators'
denial based on the same application of those short time frames.
The trial court's ruling is especially problematic in light of the fact that it had
earlier ruled that the Evans did timely appeal Educators decision as of January 11, 2004,
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to deny his "own occupation" benefits. Record, pp. 575-577. The trial court's
subsequent ruling upholding Educators' denial of Evans' appeal based on the argument
that Evans had not timely produced his medical records, Record, pp. 795-796, had the
effect of eviscerating the earlier Order.
The trial court failed to take into account the inherent collaborative nature of an
appeal process and the need to give a claimant such as Evans a full and fair opportunity
to submit a meaningful appeal. In other contexts involving administrative appeal of
denied disability benefit claims, a full and fair review requires, "knowing what evidence
the decision-maker relied upon, having an opportunity to address the accuracy and
reliability of the evidence and having the decision-maker consider the evidence presented
by both parties prior to reaching and rendering his decision." See Sage v. Automation,
Inc. Pension Plan & Trust 845 F.2d 885, 893-94(10th Cir. 1988) (discussing ERISA's
pre-litigation review process). Educators did not conduct a full and fair review of Evans'
claim, nor did it fairly consider all of Evans' evidence before it issued its denial. It cut
Evans off at the pass by asking the trial court to rule on its denial of Evans benefits, not
by looking at the evidence Evans submitted, but by simply ruling that Evans had not
acted in a timely manner in submitting that evidence. The trial court erred in refusing to
review Evans' claim on its merits.
It is not as if Evans submitted no medical evidence of his right to receive benefits
after the initial 24-month period due to being disabled from any occupation. Evans
submitted substantial medical records documenting his continuing degenerative disc
disease, s/p C5-6 fusion for radiculopathy, chronic neuropathic pain syndrome, post Gulf
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War syndrome, interstitial lung disease, coronary artery disease, chronic fatigue
syndrome, organic brain syndrome s/p head injury, chronic migraine headaches and posttraumatic stress disorder. Evans' treating physician, Dr. Wood, supported the long-term
disability claim by indicating that Evans was unable to work in any occupation. Record
p. 281.
This Court should reverse the trial court ruling that Evans did not timely submit
this information and should remand the case for consideration of Evans claims of
disability beyond the initial 24 month period on their merits.
Respectfully submitted this ^_ day of March, 2010.

Brian S. King
/
Attorney for Appellant (loel Evans
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TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART II. PERSONNEL
CHAPTER 61. RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory
10 USCS §1203
§ 1203. Regulars and members on active duty for more than 30 days: separation
(a) Separation. Upon a determination by the Secretary concerned that a member described in section 1201(c) of this
title [10 USCS § 1201(c)] is unfit to perform the duties of the member's office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical
disability incurred while entitled to basic pay or while absent as described in section 1201(c)(3) of this title [10 USCS §
1201(c)(3)], the member may be separated from the member's armed force, with severance pay computed under section
1212 of this title [10 USCS § 1212], if the Secretary also makes the determinations with respect to the member and that
disability specified in subsection (b).
(b) Required determinations of disability. Determinations referred to in subsection (a) are determinations by the
Secretary that—
(1) the member has less than 20 years of service computed under section 1208 of this title [10 USCS § 1208];
(2) the disability is not the result of the member's intentional misconduct or willful neglect, and was not incurred
during a period of unauthorized absence;
(3) based upon accepted medical principles, the disability is or may be of a permanent nature; and
(4) either-(A) the disability is less than 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the Department
of Veterans Affairs at the time of the determination, and the disability was (i) the proximate result of performing active
duty, (ii) incurred in line of duty in time of war or national emergency, or (iii) incurred in line of duty after September
14,1978;
(B) the disability is less than 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the Department
of Veterans Affairs at the time of the determination, the disability was not noted at the time of the member's entrance on
active duty (unless clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the disability existed before the member's
entrance on active duty and was not aggravated by active military service); or
(C) the disability is at least 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the Department of
Veterans Affairs at the time of the determination, the disability was neither (i) the proximate result of performing active
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duty, (ii) incurred in line of duty in time of war or national emergency, nor (iii) incurred in line of duty after September
14, 1978, and the member has less than eight years of service computed under section 1208 of this title [10 USCS §
1208] on the date when he would otherwise be retired under section 1201 of this title [10 USCS § 1201] or placed on
the temporary disability retired list under section 1202 of this title [10 USCS § 1202].
However, if the member is eligible for transfer to the inactive status list under section 1209 of this title, and so elects, he
shall be transferred to that list instead of being separated.
HISTORY:
(Aug. 10,1956, ch 1041, § 1, 70A Stat. 92; Sept. 2,1958, P.L. 85-861, § 1(28)(A), 72 Stat. 1451; Sept. 7,1962, P.L.
87-651, Title I, § 107(a), 76 Stat. 508; Sept. 19,1978, P.L. 95-377, § 3(2), (3), 92 Stat. 719; Sept. 8, 1980, P.L. 96-343,
§ 10(c)(2), (3), 94 Stat. 1129; Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513, Title I, § 117, 94 Stat. 2878; Nov. 29, 1989, P.L. 101-189,
Div A, Title XVI, Part C, § 1621(a)(1), 103 Stat. 1602; Oct. 5,1994, P.L. 103-337, Div A, Title XVI, Subtitle C, §
1671(c)(6), 108 Stat. 3014; Sept. 23, 1996, P.L. 104-201, Div A, Title V, Subtitle H, § 572(c), 110 Stat. 2533.)
(As amended Jan. 28,2008, P.L. 110-181, Div A, Title XVI, Subtitle D, § 1641(b), 122 Stat. 465; Oct. 14,2008, P.L.
110-417, [Div A,] Title VII, Subtitle C, § 727(b), 122 Stat. 4510.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

Prior law and revision:
1956 Act
Revised Section Source (USCS)
1203

Source (Statutes at Large)

37:272(a) (2d Oct. 12, 1949, ch. 681,
proviso). Sec. 402(a) (2d proviso),
37:272(b) (2d and last (b)(2d and last proviprovisos). sos), 63 Stat. 816, 817.

To state fully in the revised section the rule contained in 37:272(a)(2d proviso) and 272(b) (2d and last provisos), the
provisions of 37:272(a) (less clause (5), and less 1st proviso), 272(b) (less clause (5), and less 1st proviso) and 272(f)
(less applicability to 37:272(c) and (e)), also contained in section 1201 of this title, are repeated. The words "the
member may be separated" are substituted for the words "the member concerned shall not be eligible for any disability
retirement provided in this section, but may be separated for physical disability," in 37:272(a) (2d proviso) and
37:272(b) (2d proviso).
Clause (1) is inserted for clarity, since a member who had over 20 years of service would qualify under section 1201
or 1202 of this title.
Clause (4)(A) is substituted for 37:272(a) (1st 20 words of 2d proviso).
Clause (4)(B) is substituted for 37:272(b) (1st 20 words of 2d proviso).
Clause (4)(C) is substituted for 37:272(b) (last proviso).
The last sentence of the revised section, relating to transfer to the inactive status list, is inserted for clarity because of
section 1209 of this title.
1958 Act
Revised Section Source (USCS)

Source (Statutes at Large)
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*** CURRENT THROUGH PL 111-145, APPROVED 3/4/2010 ***
TITLE 38. VETERANS* BENEFITS
PART II. GENERAL BENEFITS
CHAPTER 11. COMPENSATION FOR SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY OR DEATH
SUBCHAPTER II. WARTIME DISABILITY COMPENSATION
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory
38 USCS §1110
§ 1110. Basic entitlement
For disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a
preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, or air service, during a
period of war, the United States will pay to any veteran thus disabled and who was discharged or released under
conditions other than dishonorable from the period of service in which said injury or disease was incurred, or
preexisting injury or disease was aggravated, compensation as provided in this subchapter [38 USCS §§ 1110 et seq.],
but no compensation shall be paid if the disability is a result of the veteran's own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol
or drugs.
HISTORY:
(Sept. 2,1958, P.L. 85-857, § 1,72 Stat. 1119; Nov. 5,1990, P.L. 101-508, Title VIII, Subtitle F, § 8052(a)(2), 104
Stat. 1388-351; Aug. 6,1991, P.L. 102-83, § 5(a), 105 Stat. 406.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

Prior law and revision:
This section is based on 38 USC§2310 (Act June 17,1957, P.L. 85-56, Title III, Part B, § 310, 71 Stat. 96).
This section is also based on the following provisions, which were repealed by Act June 17,1957, P.L. 85-56, Title
XXII, §2202, 71 Stat. 162:
Veterans' Regulation No. 1(a), Part I, para. 1(a) (as amended Acts July 13,1943, ch 233, § 9(a), 57 Stat. 556; Aug. 4,
1955, ch 561, §1,69 Stat. 497).
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Copyright 2010 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. *
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/2009); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) *
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CASES) *
TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 21. INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
PART 3. SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312 (2009)

§ 31A-21-312. Notice and proof of loss
(1) Every insurance policy shall provide that:
(a) when notice of loss is required separately from proof of loss, notice given by or on behalf of the insured to any
authorized agent of the insurer within this state, with particulars sufficient to identify the policy, is notice to the insurer;
and
(b) failure to give any notice or file any proof of loss required by the policy within the time specified in the policy
does not invalidate a claim made by the insured, if the insured shows that it was not reasonably possible to give the
notice or file the proof of loss within the prescribed time and that notice was given or proof of loss filed as soon as
reasonably possible.
(2) Failure to give notice or file proof of loss as required by Subsection (l)(b) does not bar recovery under the
policy if the insurer fails to show it was prejudiced by the failure. This subsection may not be construed to extend the
statute of limitations applicable under Section 31A-21-313.
(3) The insurer shall, on request, promptly furnish an insured any forms or instructions needed to make a proof of
loss.
(4) As an alternative to giving notice directly under Subsection (l)(a), it is a sufficient service of notice or of proof
of loss if a first class postage prepaid envelope addressed to the insurer and containing the proper notice or proof of loss
is deposited in any United States post office within the time prescribed.
(5) The commissioner shall adopt rules dealing with notice of loss and proof of loss time limitations under
insurance policies. Under Section 3IA-21-202, the commissioner's express approval must be received before any
contract clause requiring notice of loss or proof of loss in a manner inconsistent with the rule may be used in an
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insurance contract.
(6) The acknowledgment by the insurer of the receipt of notice, the furnishing of forms for filing proofs of loss, the
acceptance of those proofs, or the investigation of any claim are not alone sufficient to waive any of the rights of the
insurer in defense of any claim arising under the insurance policy.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 31A-21-312, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 148.
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. -Reports of fires of suspicious origin, § 53-7-214.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Failure to file proof of loss.
Filing notice of claim.
FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF LOSS.
Insured, who suffered irrecoverable, entire loss of sight in one eye within a few days after a fall, could not delay the
filing of his proof of loss for nearly three years on ground that he personally did not admit or realize his loss was
irrecoverable. Hunter v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971).
FILING NOTICE OF CLAIM.
Although notice of claim and proof of loss have similarities, the two are distinct, and fact that notice may have been
given does not dispense with requirement of furnishing formal proof of loss. Hunter v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448
F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971).
Insurer established that it suffered actual prejudice due to lack of timely notice of its insured's claim, so that its insured
could not recover under the exception in Subsection (l)(b). As a result of the insured's failure to timely notify the
insurer of the occurrences that led to a claim, the insurer did not have the opportunity to investigate the claim,
participate in a decision to replace a fiber optic line damaged by its insured, or defend against the loss. Utah Transit
Auth. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., F. Supp. 2d, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76694 (D. Utah Oct. 18,2006).
Though theft of property from a rental condominium unit was covered by the property manager's general commercial
liability insurance policy, the insured's failure to give notice of a lawsuit against it insulated the insurer if the insurer
was prejudiced by the failure. The issue of prejudice was one of fact not suitable for resolution by summary judgment.
Mullin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 541 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. —44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1315 et seq.
C J.S. --46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1245 et seq.
A.L.R. -Necessity and sufficiency of insurer's demand, under fire insurance policy, for examination of insured or his
books or papers, or for proofs of loss, certificates, or sworn statements, 4 A.L.R. 3d 631.
Time within which demand for appraisal of property loss must be made, under insurance policy providing for such
appraisal, 14 A.L.RJd 674.
Overvaluation in proof of loss of property insured as fraud avoiding fire insurance policy, 16A.L.R.3d 774.
Disability insurance or provision: clause requiring notice of claim within specified time or as soon as reasonably
possible, or the like, 17 A.L.RJd 530.
"Physical damage": provisions of burglary or theft policy requiring losses evidenced by "physical damage to
premises," 22 A.L.R.3d 1305.
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TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 21. INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
PART 3. SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
UtahCodeAnn. § 31A-21-313 (2009)
§ 31A-21-313. Limitation of actions
(1) An action on a written policy or contract offirstparty insurance must be commenced within three years after the
inception of the loss.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this title, the law applicable to limitation of actions in Title
78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies.
(3) An insurance policy may not:
(a) limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a time less than that authorized by statute;
(b) prescribe in what court an action may be brought on the policy; or
(c) provide that no action may be brought, subject to permissible arbitration provisions in contracts.
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant will arise from a delay in bringing
suit against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on an
insurance policy to compel payment under the policy until the earlier of:
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the policy;
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment.
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration
procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties.

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT

49-8-201
PART 2

SYSTEM AND FUND
49-8-201. Creation of insurance program.
There is created for the employees of the state, its educa
tional institutions, and political subdivisions the "Group Insurance Program"
1987
49-8-202. Creation of fund
There is created the "Group Insurance Trust Fund" for the
purpose of paying the benefits and the costs of administering
this program The fund shall consist of all money paid into it
in accordance with this chapter, whether in the form of cash,
securities, or other assets, and of all money received from any
other source Custody, management, and investment of the
fund shall be governed by Title 49, Chapter 1
1987
49-8-203.

Eligibility for participation in program —
Optional for certain groups.
(1) All employers of the state, its educational institutions,
and political subdivisions are eligible to participate in this
program, but this section does not require political subdivisions, school districts, or institutions of higher education,
including technical colleges, to participate in the program
(2) The Department of Health may participate in this
program for the purpose of providing program benefits to
children enrolled in the Utah Children's Health Insurance
Program created in Title 26, Chapter 40, if the provisions in
Subsection 26 40 110(4) occur If the Department of Health
participates in the program under the provisions of this
Subsection (2), all insurance risk associated with the Children's Health Insurance Program shall be the responsibility of
the Department of Health and not the group insurance division or the retirement office
1998
49-8-204.

Group insurance division — Establishment
of separate risk pools — Rules governing admission to program
The group insurance division shall establish
(1) separate nsk pools for state employees, political
subdivisions, and, if applicable, children enrolled in the
Utah Children's Health Insurance Program, created in
Title 26, Chapter 40, for purposes of providing the benefits
permitted by this chapter, and
(2) rules and procedures governing the admission of
political subdivisions to the program
1998
PART 3
CONTRIBUTIONS

49-8-301.

Self-funded program — Contributions by employer and employee.
The self-funded program shall be maintained on a financially and actuarially sound basis by means of contributions
by the employer and the employee
1987

MISCELLANEOUS
49-8-401.

Group insurance division — P o w e r s and duties.
(1) The group insurance division of the retirement office
shall
(a) act as a self insurer of employee group benefit plans
and administer those plans,
(b) enter into contracts with private insurers to underwrite employee group benefit plans and to reinsure any
appropriate self-insured plans,
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(c) publish and disseminate descriptions of all employee benefit plans under this chapter m cooperation
with the Department of Human Resource Management
and political subdivisions,
(d) administer the process of claims administration of
all employee benefit plans under this chapter or enter into
contracts, after competitive bids are taken, with other
benefit administrators to provide for the administration of
the claims process,
(e) obtain an annual actuarial evaluation of all selfinsured benefit plans and prepare an annual report for
the governor and the Legislature describing the employee
benefit plans being administered by the retirement office
detailing historical and projected program costs and the
status of reserve funds,
(f) consult with the Department of Human Resource
Management and the executive bodies of other political
subdivisions to evaluate employee benefit plans and develop recommendations for new or improved benefit
plans,
(g) submit annually a budget which includes total
projected benefit and administrative costs,
(h) maintain reserves sufficient to liquidate the
unrevealed claims liability and other liabilities of the
self-funded employee group benefit plans as estimated by
the board's consulting actuary,
d) submit its recommended benefit adjustments for
state employees upon approval of the board to the director
of the Department of Human Resource Management The
Department of Human Resource Management shall include the benefit adjustments in the total compensation
plan recommended to the governor required by Subsection 67-19-12(6Xa),
(j) adjust benefits, upon approval of the board, and
upon appropriate notice to the state, its educational
institutions, and political subdivisions,
(k) for the purposes of stimulating competition, establishing better geographical distribution of medical care
services, and providing alternative health and dental plan
coverage for both active and retired employees, request
proposals for alternative health and dental coverage at
least once every three years, proposals which meet the
criteria specified in the request shall be offered to active
and retired state employees and may be offered to active
and retired employees of political subdivisions at the
option of the political subdivision, and
(1) perform the same functions established in Subsections (l)(a), (b), (d), and (g) for the Department of Health
if the group insurance division provides program benefits
to children enrolled in the Utah Children's Health Insurance Program created in Title 26, Chapter 40
(2) Funds budgeted and expended shall accrue from premiums paid by the various employers Administrative costs may
not exceed that percentage of premium income which is
recommended by the board and approved by the governor and
the Legislature
1998
49-8-402. Reserves to b e held — Refunds.
In no case may the average total reserves in a given fiscal
year fall below the level of two months' premiums If substantial excess reserves are accrued above those required by this
chapter, and the board determines that a refund is appropriate, refunds shall be made to an employer and employee on the
basis of the contribution of each to the plan The board may
make a full refund to any employer, other than the state, and
the employer is responsible for refunding employee contributions in accordance with this section
1987
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UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT

49-8-403. Assistance to members in purchase of life,
health, dental, and medical insurance after
retirement — Employment of personnel to
administer section — Governor's and legislative benefit.
(1) (a) The board may assist active and retired members
and beneficiaries and inactive members of the various
retirement systems administered under its direction, to
purchase life, health, dental, and medical insurance on a
group basis which can be continued after retirement
under rules adopted by the board
(b) The executive director may employ any personnel,
including consultants, to administer this section
(2) (a) The board shall annually report and the state shall
pay the percentage described in Subsection (2Xc) of the
cost of providing a paid-up group health insurance policy
for members and their surviving spouses covered under
Title 49, Chapter 7, Governor's and Legislative Service
Pension Act who
d) retire after January 1, 1998,
(n) are at least 62 but less than 65 years of age,
(m) elect to receive and apply for this benefit to the
group insurance division, and
(iv) are active members at the time of retirement
or have retired and continued insurance coverage
with the group insurance division until the date of
eligibility for the benefit under this Subsection (2)
(b) The board shall annually report and the state shall
pay the percentage described in Subsection (2Xc) of the
cost of providing Medicare supplemental insurance for
members and their surviving spouses covered under Title
49, Chapter 7, Governor's and Legislative Service Pension
Act who
(i) retire after January 1, 1998,
(u) are at least 65 years of age, and
(m) elect to receive and apply for this benefit to the
group insurance division
(c) The following percentages apply to the benefit described in Subsections (2)(a) and (b)
0) 100% if the member has 10 or more years of
service,
(n) 80% if the member has 8 or more years of
service,
(m) 60% if the member has 6 or more years of
service, and
(iv) 40% if the member has 4 or more years of
service
1999
49-8-404. Audit submitted to Insurance Department.
The Insurance Department shall biennially audit all funds
and programs authorized under this chapter and report its
findings to the governor and the Legislature, but the commissioner may accept the annual audited statement of programs
under this chapter m lieu of the biennial audit requirement
2000

Insurance benefits for employees' beneficiaries.
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Children" includes stepchildren and legally
adopted children
(b) "Line of duty death" means a death resulting from
external force or violence occasioned by an act of duty as
an employee
(2) The beneficiary of an employee who is employed by the
state and who dies in the line of duty shall receive
(a) the proceeds of a group term life insurance policy in
the amount of $50,000 to be purchased by the division and
paid for by the employing unit, and

49-9-102

(b) a group health insurance policy paid for by the
employing unit that covers the employee's
(I) surviving spouse until remarriage, and
(II) unmarried children up to the age of 26
(3) Any political subdivision may provide the benefit under
Subsection (2)
2000
CHAPTER 9
UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' DISABILITY ACT
Parti
General Provisions
Section
49-9-101
49-9-102
49-9-103

Short title
Purpose
Definitions
Part 2
The Program and Fund

49-9-201
49-9-202
49-9-203

Creation of program
Creation of trust fund
Eligibility for membership in the program
Part 3
Contributions

49-9-301
49-9-302

Contributions to fund program — Adjustment of
premium rate
Rates established on basis of agency experience
— Limitations — Annual report to governor
and Legislature
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49-9-401
49-9-402
49-9-403
49-9-404
49-9-405
49-9-406
49-9-407

Disability benefits — Proof required — Eligibility
Calculation of disability benefit — Reduction of
benefit — Circumstances — Eligibility for benefits — Application required
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of retirement benefit
Annual adjustment to disability benefit
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49-8-405.

PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
49-9-101. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Public Employees'
Disability A c t "

1997

49-9-102. Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-term disabil
lty benefits for employees of employers participating in any
system administered by the board except employees covered
under the Firefighters' Retirement Act, or employees covered

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT

49-9-103

under the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered under
a long term disability program offered by a political subdivision which is substantially equivalent to the program offered
by the state under this chapter The program shall be administered by the executive officer of the board through the
retirement office, under the policies and rules promulgated by
the board
1987
49-9-103.
Definitions.
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a period of
continuous disability commences, and may not commence on
or before the last day of actual work
(2) "Educational institution" means a political subdivision
or an instrumentality of a political subdivision, an instrumentality of the state, or any combination of these entities, which
is primarily engaged in educational activities or the administration or servicing of educational activities The term includes the State Board of Education and any instrumentality
of the State Board of Education, institutions of higher education and their branches, school districts, and vocational and
technical schools
(3) "Elimination period" means the three months at the
beginning of each continuous penod of total disability for
which no benefit will be paid and commences with the date of
disability
(4) "Employee" means any regular full-time employee of an
employer who participates in any system administered by the
board, except those employees exempt from coverage under
Section 49 9-102
(5) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period
of time the monthly disability income benefit will be paid for
any continuous period of total disability
(6) "Medically determinable impairment" means an impair
ment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques A physical
or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings,
not only by the individual's statement of symptoms
(7) "Physician" means a legally qualified physician
(8) "Rehabilitative employment" means any board-approved occupation or employment for wage or profit, for which
the employee is reasonably qualified by education, training, or
experience, in which the employee engages while unable to
perform his occupation as a result of injury or illness
(9) "Total disability" means the complete inability, due to
medically determinable physical or mental impairment, to
engage in the employee's regular occupation during the elimination period and the first 24 months of disability benefits
Thereafter, "total disability" means the complete inability,
based solely on medically determinable physical impairment,
to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable,
considering the employee's education, training, and experience "Total disability" exists only if during any period of "total
disability" the employee is under the regular care of a physician other than the employee
2000
PART 2
THE PROGRAM AND F U N D
49-9-201. Creation of program.
There is created for employees of employers participating in
any system administered by the board, unless otherwise
exempted under this chapter, the "Public Employees' Long
Term Disability Program "
1988
49-9-202. C r e a t i o n of t r u s t fund.
There is created the "Public Employees' Disability Trust
Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits and costs of
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administering this program The fund shall consist of all
money paid into it in accordance with this chapter, whether m
the form of cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money
received from any other source Custody, management, and
investment of the fund shall be governed by Title 49, Chapter
1987

1

49-9-203. Eligibility for m e m b e r s h i p in the program.
(1) All employers participating in any system administered
by the board may cover their employees under this chapter,
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement
Act
(2) If an employer elects to cover any of his eligible employees under this chapter, all of those employees shall be covered,
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement
Act
(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any political subdivision or educational institution to be covered by this chapter
1992

PART 3
CONTRIBUTIONS
49-9-301.

Contributions to fund program — Adjustment of premium rate.
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify
to the Legislature the employer paid premium rate expressed
as a percentage of salary which is required to fund the Public
Employees' Disability Trust Fund
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall
adjust the premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the
disability trust fund
1994

49-9-302. Rates established o n basis of a g e n c y experience — Limitations — Annual report to governor and Legislature.
The board shall establish the contribution rate based on the
experience of the various public agencies and political subdivisions participating in the program, which rate may not
exceed 1% of salaries and wages and shall report annually to
the governor and the Legislature the current contribution
rates assessed to the public agencies and political subdivisions
1987
PART 4
BENEFITS
49-9-401. Disability benefits — Proof required — Eligibility.
(1) Upon receipt of proof by the board from the employer
that an employee has become totally disabled as a result of
(a) accidental bodily injury which is the sole cause of
disability and is sustained while this chapter is in force,
(b) disease or illness causing total disability commencing while this chapter is in force, or
(c) physical injury resulting from external force or
violence as a result of the performance of duty, the fund
will pay to the employee a monthly disability benefit for
each month the total disability continues beyond the
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit
period
(2) Successive periods of disability which (a) result from
the same or related causes, (b) are separated by less than six
months of continuous full-time work at the individual's usual
place of employment, and (c) commence while the individual is
an employee covered by this chapter, shall be considered as a
single period of disability The inability to work for a period
less than 15 consecutive days may not be considered as a
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period of disability Otherwise, successive periods of disability
shall be considered as separate periods of disability
(3) The board may, at any time, have any employee claiming disability examined by a physician chosen by the board to
determine if the employee is disabled, and if so, the extent of
the disability
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), any claim
brought by an employee for long-term disability benefits
under the Public Employee's Disability Program is barred
if it is not commenced within one year from the employee's
date of disability
(b) If an employee fails to commence a claim for longterm disability benefits within the time limitations prescribed by Subsection (4Xa), the board may permit an
employee to commence a claim for long-term disability
benefits if the employee demonstrates that under the
surrounding facts and circumstances the employee's failure to comply with the time limitations was reasonable
(5) Benefits for disability based primarily on psychopathy
shall be determined in accordance with Section 49-9 406
(6) Medical or psychological conditions which existed prior
to enrollment shall not be a basis for disability benefits until
the employee has had one year of continuous enrollment in the
Public Employees Long-Term Disability Program
1999
49-9-402.

Calculation of disability benefit — Reduction
of benefit — Circumstances — Eligibility for
benefits — Application required.
(1) (a) The monthly income disability benefit is two-thirds
of the regular monthly salary paid as of the last day of
actual service for the disabilities defined in Subsections
49-9-401(l)(a) and (b) and 100% of the regular monthly
salary paid as of the last day of actual service for the
disabilities defined in Subsection 49-9-401(l)(c)
(b) Payments may not be made by the fund for any
period of disability unless the employee is under the
regular care and treatment of a physician
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced
by any amount received by, or due to, the employee from the
following sources for the same period of time during which the
employee is entitled to receive the monthly disability benefit.
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by
the employee, the employee's spouse, and the employee's
dependent children, except that if Social Security benefits
are increased to compensate for a change in the Consumer
Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may
not be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits
determined at the level in effect at the time of the
commencement of benefits,
(b) workers' compensation,
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs,
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs,
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan
providing disability income benefits for which contributions or payroll deductions are made by the employer;
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or
disability program for which the employee is eligible,
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or
settlement from a third party liable to the employee for
the disability, and
(h) unemployment compensation benefits
(3) Any amounts received by, or payable to, the employee
from one or more of the sources under Subsection (2) shalL be
considered as amounts received by the employee whether or
not the amounts were actually received by the employee
(4) (a) In order to be eligible for benefits under this chapter
the employee shall first apply for all disability benefits
from governmental entities under Subsection (2) to which
the employee is or may be entitled
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(b) The employee shall also first apply at the earlies
eligible age for all retirement benefits to which the em
ployee is or may be entitled
(c) If the employee fails to apply, the board may apprj
on behalf of the employee
(d) The board may treat as income any amount th<
employee is entitled to receive but does not receive be
cause application for benefits is not made by the employe*
and may reduce the monthly disability accordingly
199
49-9-403.

Termination of disability benefits — Calcula
tion of retirement benefit.
(1) Any member, including an employee who relinquishe
rights to retirement benefits pursuant to Section 49-1-4QJ
who applies and is qualified for disability benefits shall receiv
a disability allowance until the earlier of
(a) the date the member or employee who relinquishe
rights to retirement benefits has accumulated
(I) 20 years of service credit if the member 1
covered by Chapters 4 or 4a, Public Safety Retin
ment and Noncontnbutory Retirement Acts,
(II) 25 years if the member is covered by Chapter (
Judges' Retirement Act, or
(III) 30 years if the member is covered by Chapter
2 or 3, Public Employees' Retirement and Noncor
tnbutory Retirement Acts, or
(b) the member has received disability benefits for th
following applicable time penods
(I) if the member is under age 60, the disabilit
allowance is payable until age 65,
(II) if the member is 60-61, the disability allowanc
is payable for five years,
(III) if the member is 62-63, the disability allov
ance is payable for four years,
(IV) if the member is 64-65, the disability allov,
ance is payable for three years,
(v) if the member is 66-68, the disability allowanc
is payable for two years, and
(vi) if the member is age 69 or older, the disabilit
benefit is payable for one year
(2) Upon termination of disability benefits, the disable
employee shall retire under the retirement system whic
covered the employee at the time of disability The fini
average salary used in the calculation of the retiremei
benefit shall be based on the annual rate of pay at the time
disability, improved by the annual cost-of-living increase fa
tor applied to retired participants in the system which covert
the employee at the time of disability Retirement credit sha
accrue during the period of disability unless the disable
employee is exempted from the system
(3) An employee who is in a position covered by a syste
administered by the board, but has relinquished rights
retirement benefits pursuant to Section 49-1-405, may recei\
the benefit the employee would have received by full partic
patron in the system covering the employee on the date
disability, except for the accrual of service credit, in acco
dance with this title
(4) An employee receiving disability benefits who has yea
of service credit from two or more systems or plans admini
tered by the board may not combine these credits und
Section 49-1-406 in determining eligibility for retiremen
unless the employee would receive a greater retirement be
efit by combining such credits
19
49-9-404. Annual adjustment to disability benefit.
An employee receiving disability benefits shall receive 1
annual adjustment on the employee's anniversary date
reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index as computed 1
the Bureau of Labor Statistics The adjustment shall 1
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(4) (a) The cost of providing the allowance under this
section shall be funded in fiscal year 1987-88 by a supplemental appropriation in the 1988 General Session based
on the retirement contribution rate increase established
by the consulting actuary and approved by the board.
(b) The cost of providing the allowance under this
section shall be funded beginning July 1, 1988, by means
of an increase in the retirement contribution rate established by the consulting actuary and approved by the
board.
(c) The rate increase under Subsections (4)(a) and (b)
shall be funded:
(i) for state employees, by an appropriation from
the account established by the Division of Finance
under Subsection (4)(d), which is funded by savings
derived from this early retirement incentive and a
work force reduction;
(ii) for school employees, by direct contributions
from the employing unit, which may not be funded
through an increase in the retirement contribution
amount established in Title 53A, Chapter 17a, Minimum School Program Act; and
(iii) for political subdivisions under Level B, by
direct contributions by the participating employer.
(d) (i) Each year, any excess savings derived from this
early retirement incentive which are above the costs
of funding the increase and the costs of paying
insurance, sick leave, compensatory leave, and vacation leave under Subsections (4)(c)(i) and (c)(ii) shall
be reported to the Legislature and shall be appropriated as provided by law.
(ii) In the case of Subsection (4)(c)(i), the Division
of Finance shall establish an account into which all
savings derived from this early retirement incentive
shall be deposited as the savings are realized.
(iii) In the case of Subsection (4)(c)(ii), the State
Office of Education shall certify the amount of savings derived from this early retirement incentive.
(iv) The State Office of Education and the participating employer may not spend the savings until
appropriated by the Legislature as provided by law.
5) A member who retires under this section is subject to
•tion 49-11-504.
S) The board may make rules to administer this section.
7) The Legislative Auditor General shall perform an audit
nsure compliance with this section.
2002
CHAPTER 14
UBLIC SAFETY CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT
ACT
Parti
General Provisions
ion
4-101.
4-102.
£-103.
£-104.

Title.
Definitions.
Creation of system
Creation of trust fund.
Part 2
Membership Eligibility

-201.
-202.

-203.

System membership — Eligibility.
Participation of employers — Requirements —
Supplemental programs — Full participation in system.
Exemption of certain employees from coverage.

49-14-102

Part 3
Contributions
Section
49-14-301.

Contributions — Two divisions — Election by
employer to pay employee contributions —
Accounting for and vesting of member contributions — Deductions.
Part 4
Defined Benefit

49-14-401
49-14-402.
49-14-403.

Eligibility for service retirement — Date of
retirement — Qualifications.
Calculation of retirement allowance.
Annual cost-of-living adjustment.
Part 5
Death Benefit

49-14-501.
49-14-502.
49-14-503.
49-14-504.
49-14-505.
49-14-506.

Death of active member in Division A — Payment of benefits.
Death of active member in Division B — Payment of benefits.
Benefits payable upon death of inactive member.
Benefits payable upon death of retired member.
Benefits for surviving spouse under Division A
or Division B.
Benefits payable upon death of active or inactive member without spouse or minor children.
Part 6
Disability

49-14-601.

Long-term disability coverage.
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

49-14-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Public Safety Contributory
Retirement Act."
2002
49-14-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) (a) "Compensation" means the total amount of payments that are includable in gross income which are
received by a public safety service employee as base
income for the regularly scheduled work period. The
participating employer shall establish the regularly
scheduled work period. Base income shall be determined prior to the deduction of member contributions
or any amounts the public safety service employee
authorizes to be deducted for salary deferral or other
benefits authorized by federal law.
(b) "Compensation" includes performance-based
bonuses and cost-of-livmg adjustments.
(c) "Compensation" does not include:
(1) overtime;
(ii) sick pay incentives;
(iii) retirement pay incentives;
(iv) the monetary value of remuneration paid
in kind, including a residence, use of equipment
or uniform, travel, or similar payments;
(v) a lump-sum payment or special payments
covering accumulated leave; and
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(vi) all contributions made by a participating
employer under this system or under any other
employee benefit system or plan maintained by a
participating employer for the benefit of a member or participant,
(d) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter
may not exceed the amount allowed under Internal
Revenue Code Section 401(a)(17).
(2) "Final average salary" means the amount computed
by averaging the highest three years of annual compensation preceding retirement, subject to Subsections (2)(a)
and (b).
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2Kb), the
percentage increase in annual compensation in any
one of the years used may not exceed the previous
year's compensation by more than 10% plus a costof-living adjustment equal to the decrease in the
purchasing power of the dollar during the previous
year, as measured by a United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index average as
determined by the board.
(b) In cases where the participating employer provides acceptable documentation to the office, the
limitation in Subsection (2)(a) may be exceeded if:
(i) the public safety service employee has
transferred from another agency; or
(ii) the public safety service employee has
been promoted to a new position.
(3) "Line-of-duty death" means a death resulting from
external force, violence, or disease occasioned by an act of
duty as a public safety service employee.
(4) "Participating employer" means an employer which
meets the participation requirements of Section 49-14201.
(5) (a) "Public safety service" means employment normally requiring an average of 2,080 hours of regularly scheduled employment per year rendered by a
member who is a:
(i) law enforcement officer in accordance with
Section 53-13-103;
(ii) correctional officer in accordance with Section 53-13-104; and
(hi) special function officer approved in accordance with Sections 49-14-201 and 53-13-105.
(b) "Public safety service" also requires that in the
course of employment the employee's life or personal
safety is at risk.
(c) Except for the minimum hour requirement,
Subsections (5)(a) and (b) do not apply to any person
who was eligible for service credit in this system prior
to January 1, 1984.
(6) "Public safety service employee" means an employee of a participating employer who performs public
safety service under this chapter.
(7) "System" means the Public Safety Contributory
Retirement System created under this chapter.
(8) "Years of service credit" means the number of periods, each to consist of 12 full months as determined by the
board, whether consecutive or not, during which a public
safety service employee was employed by a participating
employer, including time the public safety service employee was absent in the service of the United States
government on military duty.
2003
49-14-103. Creation of s y s t e m .
There is created for members performing public safety
service and who are employed by a participating employer the
"Public Safety Contributory Retirement System."
2002
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49-14-104. Creation of trust fund.
(1) There is created the "Public Safety Contributory R e f
ment Trust Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits
^
the costs of administering this system.
(2) The fund shall consist of a number of individual tru +
accounts created as needed to receive the money and ass t
transferred into them from the respective terminated system
all money paid into them, including interest, in accordan '
with this chapter, whether in the form of cash, secunties
other assets, and of all money received from any other source
(3) Custody, management, and investment of the fund shall
be governed by Chapter 11, Utah State Retirement Systems
Administration.
2002
PART 2
MEMBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY
49-14-201. System membership — Eligibility.
(1) Except as provided in Section 49-15-201, a public safety
service employee of a participating employer participating in
this system is eligible for service credit in this system at the
earliest of:
(a) July 1, 1969, if the public safety service employee
was employed by the participating employer on July 1,
1969, and the participating employer was participating in
this system on that date;
(b) the date the participating employer begins participating in this system if the public safety service employee
was employed by the participating employer on that date;
or
(c) the date the public safety service employee is employed by the participating employer and is eligible to
perform public safety service.
(2) (a) (i) A participating employer that has public safety
service and firefighter service employees that require
cross-training and duty shall enroll those dual purpose employees in the system in which the greatest
amount of time is actually worked.
(ii) The employees shall either be full-time public
safety service or full-time firefighter service employees of the participating employer,
(b) (i) Prior to transferring a dual purpose employee
from one system to another, the participating employer shall receive written permission from the
office
(ii) The office may request documentation to verify
the appropriateness of the transfer.
(3) The board may combine or segregate the actuarial
experience of participating employers in this system for the
purpose of setting contribution rates.
(4) (a) (i) Each participating employer participating in
this system shall annually submit to the office a
schedule indicating the positions to be covered under
this system in accordance with this chapter.
(ii) The office may require documentation to justify
the inclusion of any position under this system.
(b) If there is a dispute between the office and a
participating employer or employee over any position to
be covered, the disputed position shall be submitted to the
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council established
under Section 53-6-106 for determination.
(c) (i) The Peace Officer Standards and Training Council's authority to decide eligibility for public safety
service credit is limited to claims for coverage under
this system for time periods after July 1, 1989
(ii) A decision of the Peace Officer Standards and
Training Council may not be applied to service credit
earned in another system prior to July 1, 1989.
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member's member contributions shall be paid to the beneficiary.
(4) The combined payments to beneficiaries of any member
under this section may not exceed 75% of the member's final
average monthly salary.
2003
Benefits payable upon death of inactive
member.
(1) If an inactive member who has less than 20 years of
public safety service credit dies, the spouse at the time of
death, or, if there is no spouse at the time of death, the
member's minor children shall receive a refund of the member's member contributions or $500, whichever is greater.
(2) (a) If an inactive member with 20 or more years of
public safety service credit dies, the spouse at the time of
death shall receive an allowance in an amount of 50% of
the amount the member would have received had retirement occurred on the first of the month following the
month in which the death occurred.
(b) This allowance shall be based on years of service
credit and final average monthly salary under Section
49-15-402, reduced actuarially from age 50 to the age of
the member at the time of death if the member is under 50
years of age at the time of death.
2003

Section
49-16-103.
49-16-104.

Membership Eligibility
49-16-201.
49-16-202.

49-16-203.

Benefits for surviving spouse under Division A or Division B.
The spouse at the time of death, if eligible, shall receive a
benefit computed under either Division A or Division B,
whichever provides the larger benefit, but may not receive a
benefit under both divisions if it would result in a duplicate
benefit.
2002
49-15-506.

Benefits payable upon death of active or
inactive member without spouse or minor
children.
If an active or inactive member dies and at the time of death
the member does not have a spouse or minor children, the
benefit payable to a designated beneficiary is a refund of the
member's member contributions or $500, whichever is larger.

Part 3
Contributions
49-16-301.

Defined Benefit
49-16-401.
49-16-402.
49-16-403.

CHAPTER 16

D e a t h Benefit
49-16-501.
49-16-502.
49-16-503.
49-16-504.
49-16-505.
49-16-506.
49-16-507.

Death of active member in Division A —
Payment of benefits.
Death of active member in Division B —
Payment of benefits.
Benefits payable upon death of inactive member.
Benefits payable upon death of retired member.
Benefits for surviving spouse under Division
A or Division B.
Minimum allowance for spouse.
Benefits payable upon death of active or
inactive member without spouse or minor
children.
Part 6
Disability Benefit

49-16-601.
49-16-601.5.
49-16-602.

49-16-603.

FIREFIGHTERS' RETIREMENT ACT

Section
49-16-101.
49-16-102.

Eligibility for service retirement — Date of
retirement — Qualifications.
Calculation of retirement allowance.
Annual cost-of-living adjustment.
Part 5

PART 6
DISABILITY

Contributions — Two divisions — Election by
employer to pay employee contributions —
Accounting for and vesting of worker contributions — Deductions.
Part 4

2003

49-15-601. Long-term disability coverage.
Each participating employer shall cover its public safety
employees under Title 49, Chapter 21, Public Employees'
Long-Term Disability Act, or a substantially similar long-term
disability program.
2003

System membership — Eligibility.
Participation of employers — Full participation in system — Supplemental programs
authorized.
Exemption of certain employees from coverage — Exception.

\

49-15-504.

49-15-505.

Creation of system.
Creation of trust fund.
Part 2

49-15-503.

Benefits payable upon death of retired
member.
(1) If a retiree who retired under either Division A or
Division B dies, the retiree's spouse at the time of death shall
receive an allowance equal to 65% of the allowance that was
being paid to the retiree at the time of death.
(2) If the retiree retired solely under Division B and dies
leaving unmarried children under the age of 18 or dependent
unmarried mentally or physically disabled children, the children shall qualify for a benefit as prescribed under Subsection
49-15-502(l)(d) which is payable on the first day of the month
following the month in which the retiree died.
2003

Disability benefit — Line-of-duty disability
— Benefits — Monthly allowance.
Line-of-duty disability benefit — Benefits —
Monthly allowance.
Disability retirement — Disability allowance
eligibility — Conversion to service retirement — Examinations — Reemployment.
Suspension of benefit upon settlement of
workers' compensation claim.

Parti

Part 7

General Provisions

Volunteer Firefighters
49-16-701.

Title.
Definitions.

1000

Volunteer firefighters eligible for line-of-duty
death and disability benefits in Division A
— Computation of benefit.
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(2) The beneficiary of a covered individual who is employed
by the state and who has a line-of-duty death shall receive:
(a) the proceeds of a $50,000 group term life insurance
policy paid for by the state and administered and provided
as part of the group life insurance program under this
chapter; and
(b) group health coverage paid for by the state that
covers the covered individual's:
(i) surviving spouse until remarriage or becoming
eligible for Medicare, whichever comes first; and
(ii) unmarried children up to the age of 26.
(3) A covered employer not required to provide the benefits
under Subsection (2) may provide either or both of the benefits
under Subsection (2) by paying rates established by the
program.
(4) The benefit provided under Subsection (2)(a) is subject
to the same terms and conditions as the group life insurance
program provided under this chapter.
2003
49-20-407. Insurance mandates.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection 31A-1103(3)(f), health coverage offered to the state employee risk
pool under Subsection 49-20-202(l)(a) shall comply with the
provisions of Sections 31A-8-501 and 31A-22-605.5.
2004
49-20-408.

Prohibition against certain u s e s of Social
Security numbers.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection 31A-1103(3)(f), health, dental, medical, Medicare supplement, or
conversion coverage offered under Section 49-20-202 shall
comply with the provisions of Section 31A-22-634.
2003
49-20-409.

Long-term disability — Cost of h e a l t h cove r a g e waiver.
(1) Under the direction of the board, the program shall
provide a waiver of the cost of health insurance coverage for
state employees who receive a monthly disability benefit
under Title 49, Chapter 21, Public Employees' Long-Term
Disability Act.
(2) A participating employer, other than the state, may elect
to provide a waiver for its employees similar to the waiver
provided under Subsection (1).
2005
CHAPTER 21
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' LONG-TERM DISABILITY ACT

Parti
General Provisions
Section
49-21-101.
49-21-102.
49-21-103.
49-21-104
49-21-105.

Title.
Definitions.
Creation of program
Creation of trust fund.
Purpose.
Part 2
Membership Eligibility

49-21-201.

Program membership — Eligibility
Part 3
Contributions

^9-21-301.

Contributions to fund program —Adjustment
of premium rate.
Part 4
Disability Benefits

£

-21-401.

Disability benefits—Application — Eligibility.

Section
49-21-402.
49-21-403.
49-21-404.
49-21-405.
49-21-406.

49-21-407.

49-21-102

Reduction of benefit — Circumstances — Application for other benefits required.
Termination of disability benefits — Calculation of retirement benefit.
Annual adjustment to disability benefit.
Disability benefit — Exclusions.
Rehabilitative employment — Interview by
disability specialist — Maintaining eligibility — Additional treatment and care.
Repealed.
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

49-21-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Public Employees' Long-Term
Disability Act."
2002
49-21-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a
period of continuous disability commences, and may not
commence on or before the last day of actual work.
(2) "Elimination period" means the three months at the
beginning of each continuous period of total disability for
which no benefit will be paid. The elimination period
begins on the nearest first day of the month from the date
of disability. The elimination period may include a onetime trial return to work period of less than 15 consecutive calendar days.
(3) (a) "Eligible employee" means:
(i) any regular full-time employee as defined
under Section 49-12-102 or 49-13-102, public
safety service employee as defined under Section
49-14-102 or 49-15-102, or judge as defined under
Section 49-17-102 or 49-18-102, whose employer
provides coverage under this chapter, or the
governor of the state; and
(ii) an employee who is covered by a retirement program offered by the Teachers' Insurance
and Annuity Association of America, if the employee's employer provides coverage under this
chapter; and
(b) "Eligible employee" does not include any employee that is exempt from coverage under Section
49-21-201.
(4) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum
period of time the monthly disability income benefit will
be paid under Section 49-21-403 for any continuous period
of total disability.
(5) "Monthly disability benefit" means the monthly
payments and accrual of service credit under Section
49-21-401.
(6) "Objective medical impairment" means an impairment resulting from an injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on accepted
objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective
complaints.
(7) "Physician" means a licensed physician.
(8) "Regular monthly salary" means the amount certified by the participating employer as the monthly salary
of the eligible employee, unless there is a discrepancy
between the certified amount and the amount actually
paid, in which case the office shall determine the regular
monthly salary.
(9) " R e g u l a r o c c u p a t i o n " m e a n s e i t h e r t h e p r i m a r y d u t i e s nPrformpH h v tllP plicrihlA o m n l n m o f/vr 4-Vto fwckliro
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months preceding the date of disability, or a permanent
assignment of duty to the eligible employee.
(10) "Rehabilitative employment" means any occupation or employment for wage or profit, for which the
eligible employee is reasonably qualified to perform based
on education, training, or experience while unable to
perform the employee's regular occupation.
(11) (a) "Total disability" or "totally disabled" means
the complete inability, due to objective medical impairment, whether physical or mental, to engage in
the eligible employee's regular occupation during the
elimination period and the first 24 months of disability benefits.
(b) "Total disability" means, after the elimination
period and the first 24 months of disability benefits,
the complete inability, based solely on physical objective medical impairment, to engage in any gainful
occupation which is reasonable, considering the eligible employee's education, training, and experience.
2005

49-21 -103. Creation of program.
There is created for eligible employees the "Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Program."
2002
49-21-104. Creation of trust fund.
(1) There is created the "Public Employees' Long-Term
Disability Trust Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits
and costs of administering this program.
(2) The fund shall consist of all money and interest paid
into it in accordance with this chapter, whether in the form of
cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money received
from any other source.
(3) Custody, management, and investment of the fund shall
be governed by Chapter 11, Utah State Retirement Systems
Administration.
2002
49-21-105. Purpose.
(1) The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-term
disability benefits for eligible employees.
(2) The program shall be administered by the office, under
policies and rules adopted by the board.
2002
PART 2
MEMBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY
49-21-201. Program membership — Eligibility.
(1) The state shall cover all of its eligible employees under
this chapter.
(2) Except as provided under Subsections (5), (6), and (7),
all other employers may provide coverage for their eligible
employees under this chapter
(3) If an employer elects to cover any of its eligible employees under this chapter, all of its eligible employees shall be
covered.
(4) Nothing m this chapter requires any employer other
than the state to cover its eligible employees under this
chapter.
(5) Firefighter service employees, as defined under Section
49-16-102, are not eligible for coverage under this chapter.
(6) Public safety service employees, as defined in Sections
49-14-102 and 49-15-102, who are covered under a long-term
disability program offered by an employer which is substantially similar to this program are not eligible for coverage
under this chapter
(7) Legislators are not eligible for coverage under this
chapter.
2002
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PART 3
CONTRIBUTIONS
49-21-301.

Contributions to fund program — Adjustment of premium rate.
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify
to the Legislature the employer paid premium rate expressed
as a percentage of salary which is required to fund the Public
Employees' Long-Term Disability Trust Fund.
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall
adjust the premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the
Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Trust Fund.
2002
PART 4
DISABILITY BENEFITS
49-21-401.

Disability benefits — Application — Eligibility.
(1) An eligible employee shall apply for long-term disability
benefits under this chapter by:
(a) completing an application form prepared by the
office;
(b) signing a consent form allowing the office access to
the eligible employee's medical records; and
(c) providing any documentation or information reasonably requested by the office.
(2) Upon request by the office, the participating employer of
the eligible employee shall provide to the office documentation
and information concerning the eligible employee.
(3) The office shall review all relevant information and
determine whether or not the eligible employee is totally
disabled.
(4) If the office determines that the eligible employee is
totally disabled due to accidental bodily injury or physical
illness which is not the result of the performance of an
employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a
monthly disability benefit equal to % of the eligible employee's
regular monthly salary, for each month the total disability
continues beyond the elimination period, not to exceed the
maximum benefit period.
(5) If the office determines that the eligible employee is
totally disabled due to psychiatric illness, the eligible employee shall receive:
(a) a maximum of two years of monthly disability
benefits equal to % of the eligible employee's regular
monthly salary for each month the total disability continues beyond the elimination period;
(b) a maximum of $10,000 for psychiatric expenses,
including rehabilitation expenses preauthorized by the
office's consultants, paid during the period of monthly
disability benefits; and
(c) payment of monthly disability benefits according to
contractual provisions for a period not to exceed five years
if the eligible employee is institutionalized due to psychiatric illness.
(6) If the office determines that the eligible employee is
totally disabled due to a physical injury resulting from external force or violence as a result of the performance of an
employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a
monthly disability benefit equal to 100% of the eligible employee's regular monthly salary, for each month the total
disability continues beyond the elimination period, not to
exceed the maximum benefit period.
(7) (a) Successive periods of disability are considered as a
continuous period of disability if the period of disability:
(i) results from the same or related causes;
(ii) is separated by less than six months of continuous full-time work at the individual's usual place of
employment; and
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(iii) commences while the individual is an eligible
employee covered by this chapter.
(b) The inability to work for a period of less than 15
consecutive days is not considered as a period of disability.
(c) If Subsection (7)(a) or (b) does not apply, successive
periods of disability are considered as separate periods of
disability.
(8) The office may, at any time, have any eligible employ 3e
claiming disability examined by a physician chosen by the
office to determine if the eligible employee is totally disabled.
(9) A claim brought by an eligible employee for long-term
disability benefits under the Public Employee's Long-Term
Disability Program is barred if it is not commenced within one
year from the eligible employee's date of disability, unless the
office determines that under the surrounding facts and circumstances, the eligible employee's failure to comply with the
time limitations was reasonable.
(10) Medical or psychiatric conditions which existed prior to
enrollment may not be a basis for disability benefits until the
eligible employee has had one year of continuous enrollment
in the Public Employees Long-Term Disability Program.
(11) If there is a valid benefit protection contract, service
credit shall accrue during the period of total disability, unless
the disabled eligible employee is exempted from a system, or is
otherwise ineligible for service credit.
2003
49-21-402. R e d u c t i o n of benefit — Circumstances —
Application for other benefits required.
(1) A monthly disability benefit may not be paid for any
period of total disability unless the eligible employee is under
the ongoing care and treatment of a physician other than the
eligible employee.
(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any
amount received by, or payable to, the eligible employee from
the following sources for the same period of time during which
the eligible employee is entitled to receive a monthly disability
benefit:
(a) Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received by the eligible employee, the eligible employee's spouse, and the eligible employee's children as
determined by the Social Security Administration;
(b) workers' compensation indemnity benefits;
(c) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or
settlement from a third party liable to the employee for
the disability;
(d) unemployment compensation benefits; and
(e) automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar
insurance payments.
(3) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any
amount in excess of Vs of the eligible employee's regular
monthly salary received by, or payable to, the eligible employee from the following sources for the same period of time
during which the eligible employee is entitled to receive a
monthly disability benefit:
(a) any employer-sponsored retirement programs; and
(b) any disability benefit resulting from the disability
for which benefits are being received under this chapter.
(4) Cost-of-living increases to any of the benefits listed in
Subsection (2) may not be considered in calculating a reduction to the monthly disability benefit.
(5) Any amounts payable to the eligible employee from one
or more of the sources under Subsection (2) are considered as
amounts received whether or not the amounts were actually
received by the eligible employee
(6) (a) An eligible employee shall first apply for all disability benefits from governmental entities under Subsection
(2) to which the eligible employee is or may be entitled,
and provide to the office evidence of the applications
(b) The eligible employee shall also first apply at the
earliest eligible age for all unreduced retirement benefits
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to which the eligible employee is or may be entitled, and
provide to the office evidence of the application.
(c) If the eligible employee fails to make application
under Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the monthly disability
benefit shall be suspended.
2005
49-21-403.

Termination of disability benefits — Calculation of retirement benefit.
(1) An eligible employee covered by this chapter and eligible for service credit under a system, including an eligible
employee who relinquishes rights to retirement benefits under
Section 49-11-619, who applies and is qualified for a monthly
disability benefit shall receive a monthly disability benefit
until the earlier of:
(a) the date the eligible employee has accumulated:
(i) 20 years of service credit if the eligible employee
is covered by Chapter 14, Public Safety Contributory
Retirement Act, or Chapter 15, Public Safety Noncontributory Retirement Act;
(ii) 25 years of service credit if the eligible employee is covered by Chapter 17, Judges' Contributory
Retirement Act, or Chapter 18, Judges' Noncontributory Retirement Act; or
(iii) 30 years of service credit if the eligible employee is covered by Chapter 12, Public Employees'
Contributory Retirement Act, or Chapter 13, Public
Employees' Noncontributory Retirement Act; or
(b) the date the eligible employee has received a
monthly disability benefit for the following applicable
time periods:
(i) if the eligible employee is under age 60, the
monthly disability benefit is payable until age 65;
(ii) if the eligible employee is 60 or 61 years of age
on the date of disability, the monthly disability benefit is payable for five years;
(iii) if the eligible employee is 62 or 63 years of age
on the date of disability, the monthly disability benefit is payable for four years;
(iv) if the eligible employee is 64 or 65 years of age
on the date of disability, the monthly disability benefit is payable for three years;
(v) if the eligible employee is 66, 67, or 68 years of
age on the date of disability, the monthly disability
benefit is payable for two years; and
(vi) if the eligible employee is 69 years of age or
older on the date of disability, the monthly disability
benefit is payable for one year.
(2) (a) Upon termination of a monthly disability benefit, an
eligible employee eligible for service credit under a system
may retire under the system which covered the eligible
employee on the date of disability.
(b) The final average salary used in the calculation of
the allowance shall be based on the annual rate of pay on
the date of disability, improved by the annual cost-ofliving increase factor applied to retirees of the system
which covered the eligible employee on the date of disability
(3) An eligible employee who is eligible for service credit in
a system, but has relinquished rights to an allowance under
Section 49-11-619, may receive the benefits the eligible employee would have received by being eligible for service credit
in the system covering the eligible employee on the date of
disability, except for the accrual of service credit, in accordance with this title.
(4) An eligible employee receiving a monthly disability
benefit who has service credit from two or more systems may
not combine service credits under Section 49-11-405 in qualifying for retirement, unless the eligible employee would receive a greater allowance by combining the service credits.
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SUBJECT: Separation or Retirement for Physical Disability
References: (a) DoD Directive 1332.18, "Separation from the Military Service by
Reason of Physical Disability," February 25, 1986 (hereby canceled)
(b) Title 10, United States Code
(c) Sections 3502, 5532, 6308, and 8332 of title 5, United States Code
(d) Section 104 of title 26, United States Code
(e) through (h), see enclosure 1
1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive:
1.1. Reissues reference (a) to update policy and responsibilities for separation or
retirement for physical disability under reference (b) and related determinations under
references (c) and (d).
1.2. Incorporates policy and responsibility for conduct of Ready Reserve physical
examinations and certification of physical condition under Section 10206 of reference
(b).
1.3. Authorizes procedures under DoD Instruction 1332.38 reference (e)) and DoD
Instruction 1332.39 (reference (f)) for the DoD Disability Evaluation System (DES).
1.4. Establishes policy for processing Active and Reserve component members who
have conditions that are cause for referral for physical disability evaluation.

DODD 1332.18, November 4,1996

2. APPLICABILITY
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments
(including the Coast Guard when it is operating as a Military Service in the Navy), the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commands (hereafter referred
to collectively as "the DoD Components"). The term "Military Services," as used herein,
refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps.

3. POLICY
It is DoD policy that:
3.1. The DES shall be the mechanism for implementing retirement or separation
because of physical disability in accordance with Chapter 61 of 10 U.S.C. (reference (b)).
^ l ^ T h e DES shall consist of four elements: medical evaluation; physical disability
evaluation, to include appellate review; counseling; and final disposition.
3.3. The sole standard to be used in making determinations of unfitness due to
physical disability shall be unfitness to perform the duties of the member's office, grade,
rank or rating because of disease or injury. In addition, retirement or separation because
of physical disability requires determinations that the disability:
3.3.1. Further:
3.3.1.1. In the case of a member on active duty for more than 3 0 days,
was incurred while the member was entitled to basic pay, or any other member of the
Armed Forces, after September 23, 1996, who is on active duty but is not entitled to basic
pay under 37 U.S.C. 502(b) (reference (g)) due to authorized absence to participate in an
educational program, or for an emergency purpose, as determined by the Secretary
concerned; or
3.3.1.2. In the case of a member on active duty for 30 days or less, is the
proximate result of, or was incurred in line of duty after September 23, 1996, as a result
of:
3.3.1.2.1. Performing active duty or inactive duty training;
3.3.1.2.2. Traveling directly to or from the place at which such duty
is performed; or
3.3.1.2.3. After September 23, 1996, an injury illness, or disease
incurred or aggravated while remaining overnight, between successive periods of inactive
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duty training, at or in the vicinity of the site of the inactive duty training, if the site is
outside reasonable commuting distance of the member's residence.
3.3.2. Is of a permanent nature.
3.3.3. Was not the result of intentional misconduct or willful neglect and was
not incurred during a period of unauthorized absence.
3.4. Each member of the Ready Reserve shall be examined as to his or her physical
fitness every five years, or more often if the Secretary concerned considers it necessary,
and, if not on extended active duty or full-time National Guard duty, shall execute and
submit annually to the Secretary concerned a certificate of physical condition. Each
member of the Standby Reserve shall, in accordance with procedures established by the
Secretary, execute and submit annually a certificate of physical condition.
3.5. Any member of the Ready Reserve who is pending separation for a non-duty
related impairment or condition shall be afforded the opportunity to enter the DES for a
determination of fitness. If determined fit, the Secretary concerned may deem the
member medically qualified for retention in the Ready Reserve in the specialty for which
he or she was found fit.
3.6. Service members who have conditions that are cause for referral into the DES
shall be processed in a timely manner. In no case shall timely disposition from the
Service result in denial of transition and leave entitlements provided by statute.
3.7. The standards for determining unfitness because of physical disability or
medical disqualification and the compensability of unfitting disabilities shall be uniform
among the Services and between components within an individual Service. (See DoD
Instruction 1332.38 (reference (e)).)
3.8 Whe assignment of disability ratings shall be based on the Veterans
Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities (VASRD) (reference (h)) as
implemented by reference (e) and DoD Instruction 1332.39 (reference (f)).
^gg^STSP Service members who are otherwise eligible for, and who have the minimum
number of years of service to qualify for, military retirement under any law in effect at
the time of their physical disability evaluation, and who are pending separation for
unfitness because of physical disability or medical disqualification, shall be afforded the
opportunity to elect disability separation or to apply for, and, if approved, be retired for
length of service. Further, the same opportunity shall be afforded members
recommended for placement on or separation from the Temporary Disability Retired List
(TDRL).
3.10. A Service member shall be placed on the TDRL when the member meets the
requirements for permanent disability retirement, except that the member's disability is
3
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not determined to be stable. A disability "shall be determined to be stable when the.
ptep0nderance of medical evidence indicates the severity of the conditio wilf^)Dably
not^change within the next five years so as to warrant an increase or decrease in the
dMlnlitf"rating percentage, +
3.11. The TDRL shall be managed to meet the requirements under Chapter 61 of 10
U.S.C. (reference (b)) for periodic physical examination, suspension of retired pay, and
prompt removal from the TDRL.
3.12. As an exception to general policy, the Secretary concerned, upon the request
of the member or upon the exercise of discretion based on the needs of the Service, may
continue in a permanent limited duty status either on active duty or in the Ready Reserve
a member determined unfit because of physical disability when the member's service
obligation or special skill and experience justifies such continuation.
3.13. Service members referred for physical disability evaluation shall be afforded,
at appropriate stages of processing, comprehensive counseling on the significance of the
actions proposed and the related rights, entitlements, and benefits.
3.14. The record of proceedings for members determined unfit shall include a
recommendation or determination and supporting documentation on whether the
member's disability meets the requirements under:
3.14.1. 5 U.S.C. 3502, 5532, 6308, and 8332 (reference (c)) for entitlement to
certain considerations or exemptions if subsequently employed under Federal Civil
Service; and
3.14.2. 26 U.S.C. 104 (reference (d)) for exclusion of disability compensation
from Federal gross income for purposes of taxation.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES
4.1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, under the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall:
4.1.1. In coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs (ASD(HA)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(ASD(RA)), develop and maintain a program of instruction for the DES.
4.1.2. Monitor changes and proposed changes to military personnel and
compensation statutes and DoD policy, and other pertinent authorities, to assess their
impact on physical disability evaluation, Reserve component medical disqualification,
and related benefits; and issue timely guidance to the Military Services, as appropriate.
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4.1.3. Coordinate with the ASD(HA) and the ASD(RA) in developing policy
for referral of members into the DES.
4.1.4. Issue and maintain DoD Instruction 1332.38 (reference (e)).
4.2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, under the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall:
4.2.1. Monitor changes to the statutes, laws, and regulations of the Department
of Veterans Affairs to assess their impact on the Department of Defense's application of
the VASRD (reference (h)) to Service members determined unfit because of physical
disability, and issue timely guidance to the Military Services, as appropriate, upon
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy.
4.2.2. Develop and periodically review medical standards for referral of
Service members into the DES.
4.2.3. Recommend changes to and maintain DoD Instruction 1332.39
(reference (f)).
4.2.4. Monitor the medical element of the DES and propose corrective actions
as required.
4.2.5. Develop policies for the medical component of the DES, to include the
establishment of minimum standards for Medical Evaluation Boards (MEBs), Reserve
component medical examinations forwarded to Physical Evaluation Boards (PEBs), and
TDRL periodic reexaminations.
4.2.6. Develop and maintain a program of instruction for use by military
treatment facilities on the preparation of MEBs for physical disability cases.
4.2.7. Develop a program of instruction for use by PEB adjudicators and
appellate review authorities on the medical aspects of physical disability adjudication, to
include the application of the VASRD (reference (h)).
4.2.8. Monitor the timeliness of the medical component of the DES.
4.2.9. Develop policy for conduct of maximum interval physical examinations
and certification of physical condition for members of the Reserve components.
4.3. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, under the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall ensure that policies for the DES
are applicable to members of the Ready Reserve and those policies for the Ready Reserve
are consistent with the policies established for active component personnel.
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4.4. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:
4.4.1. Ensure compliance with Chapter 61 of 10 U.S.C. (reference (b)), this
Directive, and Instructions and guidance issued under the authority of this Directive.
4.4.2. Establish the Service-specific DES to consist of the four components
designated in paragraph 3.2., above.
4.4.3. Manage the Service-specific DES to ensure physical disability
evaluation is accomplished in a timely manner with uniform application of the governing
laws and DoD policy.
4.4.4. Ensure that physicians who serve on MEBs are trained in the preparation
of MEBs for physical disability evaluation.
4.4.5. Ensure that PEB members and applicable review authorities are trained
and certified in physical disability evaluation.
4.4.6. Ensure all matters raising issues of fraud within the DES are investigated
and resolved as appropriate.
4.4.7. Defer a determination of disability retirement of any officer who is being
processed for, is scheduled for, or has received non-disability retirement for age or length
of service until such determination is approved by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) on the recommendation of the ASD(HA) under Section
1216(b) of reference (b).

5. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective immediately.

John P. White'
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enclosures -1
El. References, continued
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El. ENCLOSURE 1
REFERENCES, continued

(e) DoD Instruction 1332.38, "Physical Disability Evaluation," November 14,1996
(f) DoD Instruction 1332.39, "Application of the Veterans Administration Schedule for
Rating Disabilities," November 14,1996
(g) Section 502(b) of title 37, United States Code
(h) Title 38, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 4, "Veterans Administration Schedule
for Rating Disabilities"
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Third Judicial District

APR - 7 2006
Prepared by:
Curtis J. Drake (0910)
Stewart O. Peay (9584)
Snell&Wilmer LLP.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

MMSWWW

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant
Educators Mutual Insurance Association

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit
corporation,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

ORDER
Case No. 040924591
Honorable L.A. Dever

vs.
JOEL EVANS, an individual,
Defendant and
Counterclaimant.
Educators Mutual Insurance Association's ("Educators") Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment ("Educators' Motion") and Joel Evans' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
("Evans' Motion") came on for regularly scheduled hearing on February 16, 2006 at
approximately 11:00 a.m. Educators was represented by Stewart O. Peay and Mr. Evans was
represented by Brian S. King and Nicole T. Durrant. Based upon the record evidence,
memoranda and arguments of counsel, and for good cause shown:
PEAYS\SLC\385776 1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Educators' Motion is granted, in part, and denied in part. With respect to Mr.

Evans5 cause of action that he is entitled to receive 100% of his salary for disability benefits
received from Educators between January 2002 and January 2004, Educators' Motion is granted.
The court finds that there are no material issues of disputed fact on this point. Mr. Evans failed
to comply with the contractual requirements of the disability benefits policy administered by
Educators for Salt Lake City Corporation (the "Plan"). Mr. Evans cannot attempt to recover
under the Plan when he failed to comply with the Plan by failing to appeal within the 30 days
required by the Plan. Therefore, his failure to abide by the Plan's dispute resolution process bars
him from recovery under the Plan to this claim.
2.

Educators Motion is denied, in part, with respect to Mr. Evans' claim that he is

entitled to disability benefits for the period after January 2004. Mr. Evans timely appealed
Educators' decision to deny benefits after January 2004 but Educators has not notified Evans of
its decision regarding that appeal.
3.

Mr. Evans' Motion is denied with respect to his claim that Educators erred in

offsetting the benefits he was to receive under the Plan with those he was receiving from the
Veterans' Administration. The court finds that there are issues of material fact on this issue.
Specifically, whether the Plan is substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. § 49-21, et seq.
4.

Mr. Evans' Motion also petitioned this court for summary judgment on two other

issues, namely, whether Mr. Evans became disabled in January 2002 as a result injuries sustained
in the line of duty and whether Mr. Evans is totally and completely disabled from "any and all
occupations" and is therefore entitled to disability benefits from Educators after January 2004.
Mr. Evans' counsel, Mr. King, took the position at oral argument that he believed there were
issues of material fact regarding these claims. Therefore, Mr. Evans Motion is denied with
respect to these causes of action.
PEAYS\SLC\385776 1

DATED this V

day of WKftCh
M t e h , 2006.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS T O F O R M

Curtis J. Drake
Stewart 0 . Peay
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
Educators Mutual Insurance Association

£••

s

Brian S. King
Nicole T. Durrant
Counsel for Defendant and Counterclaimant Joel Evans:

PEAYS\SLC\385776 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing ORDER was mailed, via first class mail, postage
prepaid, on the ffi r%ay of March, 2006 to the following:

Brian S. King
Nicole T. Durrant
336 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Third Judicial District
J. WESLEY ROBINSON, #6321
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
Salt Lake City Corporation
Room 505, City and County Building
451 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-7788

NOV 17 2006
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON SALT LAKE CITY CORP.'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOEL EVANS, an individual,
Defendant.
JOEL EVANS,
Case No. 040924591
Third Party and
Counterclaim Plaintiff,

JUDGE L.A. DEVER

v.
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Counterclaim Defendant,

and
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Third Party Defendant.

1

DEC-0B-20U6 WhU U3JU9 PH THIRD D1ST, COURT

FAX NO. 8012387407

This matter came before the Court on Third Party Defendant Salt Lake City
Corporation's ("the City") Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff Joel Evans ("Evans") filed a memorandum opposing the City's
Motion, the City filed a Reply memorandum, and submitted the matter to the Court
for decision.
Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings and the relevant legal authorities,
the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated June 10,2006. Consistent with that
Minute Entry,

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, DECREED AND ORDERED:
1,

The parties do not dispute that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act

(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.) does not apply to Evans' contract claims.
However, to the extent that Evans has asserted any cause(s) of action that do not
sound in contract, the City's motion is granted due to Evans' failure to file a notice of
claim.
2,

The City's Long Term Disability Plans ("LTD Plan") governing this

ease went into effect on July 1,2001 and June 30,2002, Because the administrative
rules relied upon by Evans were either not enacted during the relevant time periods or
do not apply vo th« relevant time periods, ihc arbitraiion provisions of the City's LTD
Plan were consistent with and enforceable under the relevant Utah law and
administrative rules.
3,

Based on the foregoing, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment is

hereby GRANTED in its entirety. Evans' Third Party Complaint against the City is
dismissed with prejudice.
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DATED this VVI1 day ortSne, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DATED:
BRIAN S. KING
Attorney for Defendant and
Third Parly Plaintiff Joel Evans

DATED:
CURTIS J. DRAKE f
/
STEWART O. PEAY f
J
Attorneys for Plaintiff aria Counterclaim
Defendant Educators Mutual Ins. Co.
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prepared by:
Brian S.King, #4610
Nicole T. Durrant, #8803
Attorney at Law
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1739
Facsimile: (801) 532-1936
brian@,briansking.com
nicole(o),bri ansking.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOEL EVANS, an individual,

ORDER GRANTING EDUCATORS
MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATIONS'
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant
JOEL EVANS,
Third Party and
Counterclaim Plaintiff,

Case No. 040924591
Judge L.A. Dever

vs.
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION,
Counterclaim Defendant.
and
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Third Party Defendant,

Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("Educators") Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment("Educators' Renewed Motion") has been evaluated based on the record evidence, memoranda
submitted by the parties and without oral argument. Now, based on this information and for good cause
appearing, the Court rules as follows:
Joel Evans did not provide supporting documentation in a timely manner in connection with his
appeal as required by the terms of the Salt Lake City Corporation's Long Term Disability Insurance
Program ("the Program"). Consequently, as to Evans' claim for long term disability benefits due to his
inability to work in any occupation, the Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the
Plaintiff in this case is granted.
However, based on the Court's earlier ruling, dated April 6, 2006, there remains the issue of
whether Educators is entitled to offset from Evans' disability benefits payments made to him by the
Department of Veterans Affairs. The Court, by previous Order, ruled that whether the Program's terms
were "substantially similar" to the requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 49-21 et seq., as required by
U.C.A. § 49-21-201(6), was a question of fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment.
The parties are directed to work together to establish a scheduling order for resolution of the
remaining issues in the case.
DATED this ^

Approved as to form:

Curtis J. Drake
Stewart O. Peay

day of May, 2007.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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vs.
Judge: L A DEVER
JOEL EVANS, an individual,
Defendant and
Counterclaimant.
Because the intent of the Court's position was not clear in the Ruling entered
January 27, 2009, specifically the last paragraph, the Court STRIKES that Ruling and
issues the following Amended Ruling.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant's
Request to Submit for Decision its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
November 28, 2008. Having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion and Defendant's Opposition
thereto, the Court makes the following findings.
Plaintiff's basis for its Renewed Motion is that in their original filings of crossmotions for summary judgment, the parties relied on the incorrect governing statute.
As a result of the parties' mutual error, this Court entered an Order on September 18,

2008. Plaintiff now seeks relief from the Order pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 60(b). See
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation
omitted) ("[A] motion under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider
its prior denial of a motion for summary judgment").
Plaintiff maintains that the appropriate statute that should be considered is Utah
Code Annotated Section 49-9-402 (2001 )\ because Defendant became disabled in
October 2001. See Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson. 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1975)
("[T]he obligation to pay compensation is governed by the law at the time the injury
occurred" (emphasis in original)).
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The parties originally relied on Section 49-21-402

Provides in relevant part:
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount
received by, or due to, the employee from the following sources for the same
period of time during which the employee is entitled to receive the monthly
disability benefit:
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependent children, except that
if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate for a change in
the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may not
be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the
level in effect at the time of the commencement of benefits;
(b) workers' compensation;
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs]
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs;
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing disability
income benefits for which contributions or payroll deductions are made by
the employer;
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for
which the employee is eligible;
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a
third party liable to the employee for the disability; and
(h) unemployment compensation benefits.

(emphasis added).
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(2002)2. Therefore, relying on the 2001 statutory language, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant's benefits should be reduced by the amount Defendant was receiving from
Veteran's Affairs, $8,510.78, plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
Defendant argues that the 2002 version applies because (1) under the Group
Long-Term Disability Plan ("Plan") Defendant had a twelve week elimination period
which he was required to fulfill before receiving benefits and, (2) Defendant's employer,
Salt Lake City Corporation, paid Defendant his full salary until June 2002, three months
after the effective date of the 2002 statute. Furthermore, Defendant claims that
pursuant to the law of the case doctrine this Court has discretionary power to decline or
reopen a matter before final judgment. See IHC v. D&KMqmt., Inc., 2008 UT 36, TJ27,
606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 ("[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation/
(footnote omitted). Thus, the doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the
same case once the court has ruled on them. In this way, the law of the case doctrine
2

Provides in relevant part:

(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or payable to, the
eligible employee from the following sources for the same period of time during which the eligible
employee is entitled to receive a monthly disability benefit:
(a) Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received by the eligible
employee, the eligible employee's spouse, and the eligible employee's dependent
children;
(b) workers' compensation indemnity benefits;
(c) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to
the employee for the disability;
(d) unemployment compensation benefits;
(e) automobile no-fault, medical payments, or simitar insurance payments; and
(f) any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits are being
received under this chapter.
(emphasis added).
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acts much like the doctrine of res judicata-furthering the goals of judicial economy and
finality—but within a single case").
In amending the 2001 statute, the Utah State Legislature was clear that its goal
was not to modify the outlined benefits, rather it was to clarify the language. H.B. 250,
54th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2002). Even if the Court were to disregard the General
Session information, reading the 2001 and 2002 statutes, the language of the statues is
consistent.
Because the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit a court from correcting an
error, Trembly. 884 P.2d at 1311, the Court STRIKES its Order of September 18, 2008.
Additionally, if Defendant was receiving benefits from Veteran's Affairs while he was
also receiving benefits under the Plan, Plaintiff is entitled to have that amount offset.
The Court initially Ordered Defendant to submit any information of a separate
disability within ten (10) days of entry of the Ruling entered January 27, 2009. The
implication of the initial order was that if Defendant had two separate disabilities then it
was acceptable to receive benefits under the Plan, in addition to the benefits Defendant
was receiving from Veteran's Affairs. That was not the intent of the Court's Order.
Such a concept was not before the Court for consideration.
Because the issue before the Court was which version of the statute was
applicable to the matter, the Court's Order was premised on the fact that if the
Defendant had a disability which arose after the amendment date then the Court would
consider the amended statute in its review. However, since the Court finds that both the
intent of the 2001 and 2002 versions of the statutes are consistent, i.e., benefits
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received from an "armed services or disability program" may be offset against any
disability benefits paid pursuant to the Plan, the Court enters Plaintiff's Proposed Order
as the correct interpretation of the Court's ruling.

Dated this 20th day of May, 2009.

BY THE COURT:
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